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INTRODUCTION
The focus of many white collar criminal offenses1 is fraud.  Yet,
fraud is not a crime with prescribed elements.  In the federal system,
there is no indictment or conviction for fraud.2  Rather, as in English
law, the term “fraud” is a “concept”3 at the core of a variety of
criminal statutes.4
Although fraud is not a crime in itself, fraud is an integral aspect of
several criminal statutes.5  For example, one finds generic statutes
such as mail fraud6 and conspiracy to defraud7 being applied to an
                                                 
1. An array of definitions have been given to describe white collar crime.  See generally
David T. Johnson & Richard A. Leo, The Yale White-Collar Crime Project:  A Review and Critique, 18
L. & SOC’Y INQUIRY 63, 65-69 (1993) (reviewing various definitions of white collar crime).
Edwin Sutherland originally coined the term “white collar crime” in a speech given to the
American Sociological Society.  See Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, Annual
Presidential Address Before the American Sociological Society (Dec. 27, 1939), reprinted in 5
AM. SOC. REV. 1, 2 (1940) (explaining that traditional conceptions and explanations of crime
neglected the criminal behavior of professional, “white-collar” individuals).
2. A state, however, may have a statute exclusively labeled “fraud.”  See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-16-6 (Michie 1978) (stating that the intentional misappropriation or taking from another
of something of value through fraudulent practices constitutes fraud in a criminal sense).
3. See ANTHONY ARLIDGE ET AL., ARLIDGE & PARRY ON FRAUD 33 (2d ed. 1996)
(introducing a section entitled “The Concept of Fraud,” which considers the types of dishonest
conduct that may amount to criminal fraud).
4. Despite the lack of a single, unified crime of fraud, statutes exist that specify the
ramifications of a fraud conviction.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8902(a) (1994) (mandating the auto-
matic debarment of a healthcare provider convicted of a criminal offense involving fraud); 29
U.S.C. § 1111 (1994) (prohibiting those convicted of fraud from holding any position in an
employee benefit plan, or any position as a consultant to an employee benefit plan, or any
position with decision-making control and/or custody over money and property of an employee
benefit plan).
5. Fraud is not limited to the criminal context.  For example, one finds references to
fraud in contract and tort law.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526-528, 530, 538
(1976) (addressing various types of misrepresentations and whether or not a finding of fraud is
appropriate); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159-162 (1979) (defining
misrepresentation, concealment, assertions by non-disclosure, and fraudulent mis-
representations).  The Restatement of Restitution states:
(1) “Fraud” in the Restatement of this Subject, unless accompanied by qualifying
words, means
(a) misrepresentation known to be such, except as stated in Subsection (3), or
(b) concealment, or
(c) non-disclosure, where it is not privileged, by any person intending or
expecting thereby to cause a mistake by another to exist or to continue, in order
to induce the latter to enter into or refrain from entering into a transaction.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 8 (1937); see also Frank J. Cavico, Fraudulent, Negligent, and
Innocent Misrepresentation in the Employment Context:  The Deceitful, Careless, and Thoughtless
Employer, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (noting that fraud has characteristics of both tort and
contract).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (prohibiting the use of the post office or interstate carrier
for the execution of a scheme or artifice to defraud).
7. See id. § 371 (criminalizing conspiracy by two or more persons to defraud the United
ever-increasing spectrum of fraudulent conduct.8  In contrast, other
fraud statutes, such as computer fraud9 and bank fraud,10 present
limited applications that permit their use only with specified conduct.
In recent years, criminal fraud statutes have multiplied, offering new
laws that often match legislative or executive priorities.11
The “concept” of fraud also appears in varying roles within
criminal statutes.  In addition to fraud being conduct subject to
punishment,12 fraud can also present itself as the level of mens rea
required for certain criminal activity.13  For example, some fraud
statutes use the term “fraudulently”14 to describe the intent required
of the actor.  A statute may also use “obtains by fraud” to describe
                                                 
States or one of its agencies).
8. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 408
(1959) (observing that the terms “conspiracy” and “defraud” have taken on very broad and
unspecific meanings); Peter Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud:  The Changing
Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 438 (1995) (explaining the expansive nature
of the mail fraud statute).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (proscribing conduct that involves
intentionally accessing a computer, without authorization, to obtain confidential information
such as government classified information or financial records).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994) (prohibiting the use of false pretenses to defraud or obtain
moneys or funds from a financial institution).
11. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting individuals from obtaining
restricted information through unauthorized access to computers); id. § 1347 (providing
criminal penalties for one who defrauds any health care benefit program).  These statutes were
adopted when Congress and federal policymakers claimed that existing enforcement tools were
inadequate to fight increasingly sophisticated schemes of fraud and abuse.  See H.R. REP. NO.
104-747, pt. 1, at 1 (1996) (summarizing the estimated $100 billion problem of health care
fraud); H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 8-9 (1984) (emphasizing the need for legislation that addresses
computer fraud given the computer’s increasing prevalence in society).  Claiming that there is
an increase in fraud, however, is not new.  See EMLIN MCCLAIN, 1 TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW 669 (1897) (“If it seems that frauds are multiplying, a full explanation of any such
appearance is to be found in the tendency toward a vast increase of the business that is done on
faith and credit . . . .”).
12. For example, frauds using the wire, radio, or television may be subject to prosecution
under the crime labeled wire fraud.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994) (providing for a fine or
imprisonment of up to five years for fraud by wire, radio or television, and up to 30 years
imprisonment or a fine of $1,000,000 if such fraud affects a financial institution).
13. It can be argued that some statutes use fraud in describing both the conduct and the
mens rea.  See id. § 1341 (limiting punishment under the “Frauds and Swindles” section of the
mail fraud chapter to those who act with the intent to defraud).  In addition to being the
essence of the offense or the mens rea of a crime, fraud can also play a tangential role in a
criminal statute.  For example, some statutes speak of a “fraudulent statement” as one of several
routes for imposing criminal liability.  The primary false statements statute prohibits one from
making “any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation . . . .”  18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. 1997).  Other statutes, including 26 U.S.C. § 9012(d), impose
criminal liability for “fraudulent evidence.”  See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(d) (1994) (making unlawful
the act of knowingly and willfully providing false information to the Federal Election
Commission).
14. For example, one who “fraudulently alters, defaces . . . any of the coins coined at the
mints of the United States” faces fines or imprisonment.  See 18 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).  Similarly,
the section of title 18 dealing with the impersonation of American National Red Cross members
provides for a fine or imprisonment for anyone who pretends to be a Red Cross agent in a
fraudulent an effort to collect or receive donations.  See id. § 917.
both the method of conduct, as well as the mental element.15  Other
statutes use the term “defraud”16 or require an “intent to defraud.”17
Finally, some provisions speak in terms of a “scheme or artifice to
defraud.”18
In addition to the legislature, executive priorities also present a
clear voice in the development of fraud.19  The expansion of
enforcement in the areas of health care fraud and financial
institution fraud has been in large part an executive function.20  One
finds prosecutorial influence in legislation,21 as well as in the
extensive use of particular statutes to meet Justice Department
priorities.22  In addition to merely using fraud statutes as a tool for
                                                 
15. See, e.g., id. § 666.  This section of title 18 concerning federally funded programs and
theft or bribery therein criminalizes, in certain specified circumstances, the conduct of one who
“embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority knowingly converts to the
use of any person other than the rightful owner, or intentionally misapplies, property . . . .”  Id.
16. See id. § 1013 (criminalizing the act of deceiving or defrauding a person or
organization by misrepresenting the character of a farm loan bond or debenture issued by the
Federal Government).
17. The section of title 18 pertaining to the impersonation of 4-H Club members or agents
provides for the punishment, by fine or imprisonment, of anyone who “falsely and with the
intent to defraud” pretends to be an agent of the 4-H Clubs.  See id. § 916; see also id. § 1022
(providing that whoever makes or delivers articles to be used in the military or naval service
with the intention of defrauding the United States shall be fined or imprisoned for up to ten
years).
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (prohibiting persons from filing a petition under title
11 in order to further a fraudulent scheme); id. § 1341 (criminalizing mailing in furtherance of
a “scheme or artifice to defraud”).
19. External factors, such as the media, can also have an impact on the development of the
law.  See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To Do With It?  The Political, Social, Psychological and Other
Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 49-
51 (1997) (explaining that the news and entertainment media’s coverage of crime influences
viewers to perceive crime as an important topic and that crime should, therefore, be addressed
by those maintaining or running for elected office).
20. Attorney General Janet Reno has made heath care fraud prosecution the Justice
Department’s second priority, following only violent crime.  See Barton Carter et al., Note,
Health Care Fraud, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 713, 714 (1997) (citing Pam Belluck, In Crackdown on
Health Care Fraud, U.S. Focuses on Training Hospitals and Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, at
A32).  The FBI’s investigations into white collar offenses, such as health care fraud and financial
institution fraud, also affect the law’s development.  See FBI’S White Collar Crime Program
Expanding Rapidly, 8 Corp. Crime Rep. (Am. Communcations & Publ’g Co. ) 4, 4 (Oct. 17,
1994).  Some argue that the federal role should be “limited to cases beyond the reach of most
local prosecutors and which pose the greatest risk to society, like those involving large criminal
organizations and those with substantial interstate or foreign elements.”  Joe D. Whitley, White
Collar Crime:  A Real Priority, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 27, 1993, at 19.
21. In discussing “Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse, and the Department of
Justice’s heath care fraud enforcement program,” Gerald Stern, Special Counsel for Heath Care
Fraud at the Department of Justice, stated that Congress could aid anti-fraud enforcement
efforts by passing a general health care fraud statute.  Prosecutors would then no longer have to
use mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and other statutes for health care fraud cases.  See
Keeping Fraudulent Providers Out of Medicare and Medicaid:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th
Cong. 50 (1995) (statement of Gerald Stern, Special Counsel for Health Care Fraud, U.S.
Department of Justice).
22. See Charles Pereyra-Suarez & Carole A. Klove, Ring Around the White Collar:  Defending
prosecuting criminality, prosecutors have also generated new theories
of fraud.23
As one might suspect, the legislature and executive are not the sole
sources framing the “concept” of fraud.  Judicial interpretation also
affects the amount of flexibility offered under a fraud statute.24  For
example, the “scheme or artifice to defraud” element of generic
fraud statutes, such as mail fraud, has expanded and contracted
throughout the years.25  In some instances courts have allowed a fraud
statute to reach a new type of criminality unanticipated by Congress.26
Recent judicial rejection of prosecutors’ attempts to use novel
theories of prosecution, however, has aptly placed limits on the
government’s ability to bring additional activities under the
definition of criminal fraud.27
This Article commences with a discussion of the “concept” of
                                                 
Fraud and Abuse, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 31, 31 (1996) (noting that, in response to the Justice
Department’s top priority of preventing fraud and abuse in the health care industry, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles is enforcing several federal fraud statutes including those
involving the Medicare and Medicaid programs, false statements to the government, mail fraud
and wire fraud laws, and other statutory provisions).
23. See, e.g., United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1255 (2d Cir. 1994) (vacating a
conviction and dismissing an indictment where prosecutors alleged that the defendant had
used mailings as part of a scheme to defraud a corporation, its officers, directors, and
shareholders of the right to control corporate funds).
24. See Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
5, 9 (1997) (stating that Congress implicitly delegates lawmaking power to the judiciary when it
uses ambiguous terms such as “fraud,” “thing of value,” and “enterprise” in federal criminal
statutes).
25. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud:  The Continuing Story of the
“Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1983) (reviewing cases
demonstrating the evolution of the mail fraud statute; the expansion of embezzlement to
include misappropriation of partnership assets; the inclusion of computer fraud and other
privacy invasions in fraud statutes; and the judiciary’s disregard of the elements of criminal
larceny in fraudulent misrepresentation cases); see also Henning, supra note 8, at 438-39
(pointing out that courts impose few restrictions on their application of the “scheme and
artifice to defraud element”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights
Doctrine:  Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 160-61 (1994) (discussing the
courts’ broad interpretation of the “scheme to defraud” element of the mail fraud statute);
Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud:  Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223, 226-29 (1992) (providing a
brief history of the mail fraud statute’s “scheme to defraud” element); Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal
Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 789-90 (1980) (introducing the discussion of
the different trends in judicial interpretation of the mail fraud statute); Gregory Howard
Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree:  The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV.
137, 151 (1990) (noting the “floating definition of ‘a scheme to defraud’”).
26. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (allowing intangible
property as a scheme to defraud for the purposes of mail fraud).
27. See, e.g., United States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (stating that “[t]he mail
fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of
citizenry to good government”); United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996)
(stating that “fraud statutes do not cover all behavior which strays from the ideal”); D’Amato, 39
F.3d at 1261-62 (rejecting the use of the “false pretenses theory” for an alleged excessive
attorney fee); see also, e.g., Dean Starkman, Fraud-Conviction Reversals Imply Overzealous Use of
Broad Laws, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1997, at B7 (discussing whether reversals of mail and wire fraud
convictions indicate that the prosecution has gone too far in its use of these broad laws).
fraud, noting possible parameters of the term.28  The term “fraud”
and the manifestations of this term in the federal code are outlined.29
Although fraud’s appearance within the Model Penal Code is
examined,30 this Article focuses on federal criminal fraud.  It does not
debate where the appropriate division should be with respect to state
and federal criminality.  This Article is further limited to criminal
fraud, omitting the use of the term in the civil context.  Additionally,
it only considers instances where fraud serves as the conduct of an
offense, as opposed to being a mens rea used within a statute.
This Article describes the spectrum of fraud offenses.  The
emphasis placed on the object of the fraud offense determines where
on the spectrum the offense lies.  As used throughout this Article, the
term “object” refers to the legislative reference within the fraud
statute to the type of conduct criminalized.31  At one extreme are
generic fraud statutes, encompassing a wide range of fraudulent
conduct.32  At the opposite extreme are statutes that specifically limit
the object of the offense to a narrow range of fraudulent conduct.33
Placement on this spectrum can be a function of legislative language,
judicial interpretation, and prosecutorial application.
Various methods for limiting fraud statutes are noted.34  The
general object of the offense can be restricted,35 as can the specific
terms within the statute.36  Additionally, the manner in which the
statute expresses the fraud element can limit the offense.37  For
example, statutes using the term “scheme to defraud” tend to offer a
more pervasive application.38  Finally, fraud statutes can be restricted
by providing a high monetary threshold that makes the offense
                                                 
28. See infra Part I.A (defining criminal fraud).
29. See infra Part I.B (highlighting three approaches to fraud that can offer possible
definitions to the term).
30. See infra Part I.C (noting the limited appearance of fraud in the Model Penal Code).
31. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (criminalizing mail fraud); id. § 1343 (criminalizing
wire fraud); id. § 1344 (criminalizing bank fraud).
32. See infra Part II.A (discussing fraud statutes that employ generic language; namely
conspiracy to defraud, mail fraud and wire fraud).
33. See infra Part II.B (reviewing specific fraud statutes including bankruptcy fraud, health
care fraud, marriage fraud, and bank fraud, which employ specific language and objects).
34. See infra Part III (explaining that limiting the object of the offense, the definition of
fraud, or the monetary amount to which the statute applies are three methods by which the
legislature can set the parameters of a fraud statute).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 221-25 (arguing that the best way to curtail broad
application of fraud statutes is to provide an object with specificity).
36. See infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text (arguing that fraud statutes can be
narrowed by explicitly defining the object encompassed by the statute).
37. See infra Part III.B (positing that fraud statutes can be limited by concisely defining the
word “fraud”).
38. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the term “scheme
or artifice to defraud” in fraud statutes).
applicable only to limited conduct.39  This Article expresses the view
that generic fraud statutes exude ambiguity and promote
prosecutorial indiscretions.40  In contrast, specific fraud statutes offer
constraints while still allowing appropriate government prosecutions.
Requiring the legislature to criminalize new frauds profits
prosecutors who have seen novel theories of fraud destroyed in the
appellate process.41  Specific legislation offers defendants and society
appropriate notice.42  Specific criminal legislation is especially
important in light of the appearance of fraud in both criminal and
civil spheres.  The development of specific fraud applications does
not, however, preclude the consolidation of these fraud statutes to
offset the proliferation of federal offenses.
This Article does not call for increased criminalization to
encompass more fraudulent conduct.  Rather, it calls for specificity
within the criminal code.  Additional statutes may be warranted, but
the conduct subject to prosecution need not be extended.  Many
overlapping statutes can be discarded.43
In some instances, the generic fraud statutes are relics44 that have
evolved to a point where judicial interpretation45 and executive
prerogative usurp the legislative function.  In contrast, specific fraud
statutes, although fraught with some ambiguity, offer tighter
restraints which conform more closely with the initial legislative
purpose of the statute.  By updating and modernizing the legislative
                                                 
39. See infra notes 243-56 and accompanying text (explaining how statutes with high
monetary thresholds are subject to a less expansive reading by the courts).
40. See infra notes 257-64 and accompanying text (concluding that, due to the amorphous
nature of the “concept of fraud” and generic fraud statutes, federal criminal fraud laws are ripe
for reform).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing mail
fraud convictions and noting that, “fraud statutes do not cover all behavior which strays from
the ideal”); United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1262 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting use of a
“false pretenses theory” for an alleged excessive attorney fee); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Mail
Fraud:  Redefining the Boundaries, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 557, 560 (1998) (noting that recent
judicial decisions have defined the boundaries of the mail fraud statute by overturning
convictions won by prosecutors who utilized novel theories of mail fraud); Starkman, supra note
27, at B7 (discussing prosecutors’ broad application of fraud laws and courts’ subsequent
reversals of convictions).
42. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957) (holding that, in light of the due
process requirement of notice, citizens who are wholly unaware of a duty to act should not
suffer criminal sanctions for their mere failure to perform that affirmative act).
43. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Federal Criminal Code Reform:  Hidden Costs, Illusory Benefits, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 161 n.1 (1998) (stating that the United States Code consists of many
redundant provisions proscribing the same or similar conduct).
44. See Podgor, supra note 25, at 225 (noting that mail fraud was one section in the 1872
recodification of the Postal Act).
45. Professor Dan M. Kahan states that “federal criminal law consists of a muscular corpus
of judge-made doctrine stretched out over a skeletal statutory frame.”  Kahan, supra note 24, at
6-7.
statutes, the legislature can assume the role of “supremacy” in its
legislative function.46
I. FRAUD AS A CONCEPT
A. Defining Criminal Fraud
Fraud is not a new legal development.  Haim Cohn notes that in
biblical times fraud, although a civil concept, was “regarded as
eminently criminal in character.”47  At early common law criminal
fraud was limited to acts that defrauded the public.48  Fraud between
two private individuals, which might have no effect on the “public as
a whole,” was left for civil actions.49
Today, fraud between private parties often serves as the conduct
criminally prosecuted under federal law.  Federal jurisdiction usually
is provided by the Commerce Clause,50 although the postal51 or taxing
                                                 
46. This author argues that there is no need to discard a “legislative supremacy view” as
“fiction.”  But see id. at 11 (suggesting that it is unclear whether or not courts have the doctrinal
resources to convert the “legislative supremacy view” from “fiction” into reality).  This author
argues in response to Professor Kahan that if the courts fail to limit generic statutes
significantly, then the legislature needs to take the initiative of repealing these statutes.  See infra
notes 218-20 and accompanying text (emphasizing the indispensable role that the legislature
must play in setting the parameters of the fraud statutes).  Generic statutes should be replaced
with specific fraud statutes.  See infra Part III (noting three approaches that the legislature might
employ to limit fraud statutes, consisting of limiting the object of the offense, the definition of
fraud, and the applicable monetary threshold).  Further, in light of recent judicial reversals of
fraud convictions, allowing fraud to remain descriptively as a “gap filler” does not equate with
judicial efficiency.  See infra note 183 and accompanying text (describing judicial restraints on
prosecutorial extensions of the mail fraud statute).
47. See Haim Cohn, Fraud, in PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 498 (Menachem Elon ed., 1974)
(“[T]he same responsibility attaches for wronging the poor and needy, converting property,
and not restoring pledges, as for murder, robbery, and adultery (Ezek. 18:10-13), and for all
those misdeeds the same capital punishment is threatened.”).  Cohn asserted that the offense of
fraud pertained to “wronging another in the selling or buying of property,” see id., and that,
“[f]raud has also been held as tantamount to larceny.”  Id. at 499 (citation omitted).  Cohn also
noted the Bible’s description of specific frauds such as “particular prohibitions on fraud against
strangers (Ex. 22:20), widows and orphans (Ex. 22:21), and slaves (Deut. 23:17).”  Id.
48. See J.W. CECIL TURNER, KENNY’S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 275 (1952) (describing
fraud “[p]ractised upon the public”).  Fraud which constituted “a physical interference with the
property itself, against the will of its owner,” however, was also regarded as felonious.  See id.
49. See id. (describing the common law treatment of fraud “[p]ractised upon the
individual”); see also CLARK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 12.30 (Marian
Quinn Barnes ed., 7th ed. 1967) (distinguishing indictable frauds affecting the public at large
from private frauds); LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW:  CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS 451-54
(5th ed. 1993) (providing a historical discussion of the distinction between public and private
fraud).
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
commerce . . . .”); see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146-47 (1971) (holding that Title
II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is a permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce
Clause powers).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (providing Congress the power “[t]o establish post
offices”).  The mail fraud statute, prior to its recent amendment, was premised on postal
powers.  See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 304, 17 Stat. 283, 323, superceded by Act of June 25,
powers52 have also been sources of federal criminal jurisdiction.53
Oftentimes a federal medium, such as interstate wires or the Postal
Service, serves merely as the hook providing jurisdiction for federal
prosecution of the criminality.54
To a large extent United States law on fraud mirrors English law.55
The “classic definition” of fraud in English law focuses on “deceit” or
“secrecy.”56  In United States federal criminal law the term is often
synonymously used with the term “deceit.”57  Deception is also the
focus of civil fraud in the United States.58
                                                 
1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 763 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (giving Congress the power “[t]o lay and collect taxes”);
id. amend. XVI (giving Congress the power to levy taxes on income); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7201
(1994) (criminalizing tax evasion).
53. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 16 (2d ed. 1993)
(examining the different bases for federal jurisdiction).
54. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1127, 1149-50 (1997) (stating that the mailing element of mail fraud establishes the
constitutional derivation of Congress’ authority to regulate the mails).  Federal jurisdiction
under the Commerce Clause seldom impedes the prosecution of a criminal matter.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that cellular telephones,
cellular phone cloning tools and software, and cellphone ID numbers are “instrumentalities of
interstate commerce”).  But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (determining
that the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 went beyond Congress’ authority under the
Commerce Clause).
55. See MCCLAIN, supra note 11, at 669-70 (comparing fraud in English statutes and statutes
in the United States); ARLIDGE ET AL., supra note 3, at 33 (discussing how English law defines
fraud).
56. See ARLIDGE ET AL., supra note 3, at 33 (citing 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 121-22).  Arlidge recites the classic definition of fraud in English law:
I shall not attempt to construct a definition which will meet every case which might be
suggested, but there is little danger in saying that whenever the words “fraud” or
“intent to defraud” or “fraudulently” occur in the definition of a crime two elements at
least are essential to the commission of the crime:  namely, first, deceit or an intention
to deceive or in some cases mere secrecy; and secondly, either actual injury or possible
injury or an intent to expose some person either to actual injury or to a risk of possible
injury by means of that deceit or secrecy.
Id. (citing 2 STEPHEN, supra, at 121-22 (1973)).
57. See 1 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 16.08 (4th
ed. 1992) (characterizing fraud as a deceit).  This practice and instruction book explains that:
“Fraud” is an intentional or deliberate misrepresentation of the truth for the purpose
of inducing another, in reliance on it, to part with a thing of value or to surrender a
legal right.  Fraud, then, is a deceit which, whether perpetrated by words, conduct, or
silence, is designed to cause another to act upon it to his or her legal injury.
Id.; see also Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1904) (“The words ‘defraud’ and
‘deceive,’ as defined by lexicographers, are nearly synonymous.  ‘Defraud—to deprive of right,
either by procuring something by deception or artifice, or by appropriating something
wrongfully; to defeat or frustrate wrongfully.’  ‘Deceive—to mislead by false appearance or
statement; to frustrate or disappoint.’”).  Deceit is also used with fraud in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct:  “‘Fraud’ or ‘Fraudulent’ denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive
and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant
information.”  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology, at 13 (1983).
58. See supra note 5 (discussing fraud outside of the criminal context such as contracts and
tort law); see also Milton D. Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 176, 179 (1943) (“The core of the idea of fraud in the discreet sense is deception, i.e.,
mistake for which the other party is knowingly responsible.”).
Fraud, however, is not an easily defined term.59  The definition may
change depending upon the statute in which the word appears.60  For
example, in the crime of conspiracy to “defraud the United States,”61
“defraud” is uniquely defined to include a dishonest obstruction of a
government agency.62
The definition can also be reflective of particular precedent in a
jurisdiction.  In some cases the definition of fraud may not be limited
to fraud methodology, but may also include the harm or
consequences of the fraudulent conduct.  For example, some courts
explicitly state that merely having a “scheme to deceive” is not the
same as a “scheme to defraud.”63  A “contemplated harm to the victim
is necessary” for a “scheme to defraud.”64
Prosecutors have employed different theories of fraud in criminal
cases under the same fraud statute.65  The lack of consistency in
                                                 
59. In discussing fraud in the context of contracts and wills, Milton D. Green has noted:
Fraud, like many familiar concepts, is one which seems to have a perfectly obvious
meaning until we try to define it.  The man in the street knows what fraud is, precisely
as he knows what justice is.  The lawyer blithely speaks of this or that conduct as
fraudulent.  So do the courts.  In much of the judicial discussion of fraud it is assumed
as self-evident that the reader knows what fraud is, so why bother to define it?
However, when in the actual decision of a case it becomes necessary to frame a
definition of fraud the courts encounter difficulty.  Sometimes they meet it by saying
that fraud is so various in its manifestations that it would be fruitless to attempt a
definition, and that each case must be determined as it arises according to its own
circumstances.  Following the same tack, some text-writers have also refused to attempt
the formulation of a definition.  Others, of more venturesome disposition, have
constructed definitions, although there is not complete agreement among them.  The
American Law Institute has defined fraud in its Restatement of Contracts, and again in
its Restatement of Restitution.
Green, supra note 58, at 177-78 (footnotes omitted).  One finds references in legal literature to
“legal,” “constructive,” “positive,” and “actual” fraud.  See id. at 179.
60. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES
ASSOCIATION, SIXTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.01B, at 71 (1991)
(noting that a broader definition may be attributed to the term “defraud” when used in the
context of the federal conspiracy statute).  “The word ‘defraud’ is not limited to its ordinary
meaning of cheating the government out of money or property.  ‘Defraud’ also means
impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any government agency or
department by dishonest means.”  Id.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
62. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 426-27 (recognizing that the statute is broad enough to
embody any conspiracy “for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful
function of any” government department) (citing Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1910)).
63. See United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that to have a
scheme to defraud one needs “deceit coupled with a contemplated harm to the victim”);
United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that misrepresentations
amounting only to deceit are insufficient to sustain a charge of mail or wire fraud); United
States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that an intent
to deceive, without more, fails to constitute “fraudulent intent,” a critical element in a “scheme
to defraud”); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud:  Limiting the Limitless, CHAMPION, Dec. 1994, at
4 (discussing how the courts have limited what can constitute as a “scheme to defraud”).
64. Starr, 816 F.2d at 98 (maintaining that to find a “scheme to defraud . . . the deceit must
be coupled with a contemplated harm to the victim”).
65. For example, in D’Amato, prosecutors unsuccessfully used both “the right to control
defining fraud is not limited to issues of conduct, but also can be seen
when the term is used to describe the mens rea.  Differing definitions
may appear when the term used is “fraudulent,”66 “intent to
defraud,”67 or “scheme or artifice to defraud.”68
Although judges differ on whether a narrow or broad application
should be given to a fraud statute, there appears to be an acceptance
of an “I know it when I see it”69 approach.  Judge Holmes of the Fifth
Circuit stated that “the law does not define fraud; it needs no
definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human
ingenuity.”70  Another court noted that “[t]he aspect of the scheme to
‘defraud’ is measured by [a] nontechnical standard.  It is a reflection
of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right
dealing in the general and business life of members of society.”71  In
                                                 
theory” and a “false pretenses theory” for the alleged mail fraud charges.  See 39 F.3d at 1257-62.
In D’Amato, the government alleged a “right to control theory,” claiming that “D’Amato
committed mail fraud by structuring his billings to conceal from those in control of corporate
funds the nature of his relationship with Unisys and the fact that his actual services involved
lobbying his brother, a United States Senator and member of the Senate Appropriations
Committee.”  Id. at 1252.  The government also alleged a “false pretenses theory” claiming that
“D’Amato committed mail fraud by contracting with Unisys to provide written reports on
Senate proceedings while never intending to provide those reports.”  Id.  Similarly, in Siddiqi v.
United States, 98 F.3d 1427 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit rejected the prosecutor’s use of
shifting theories of guilt in an alleged Medicare billing fraud case.  See id. at 1438.  The court
stated:  “We find the ointment’s fly in the failure of the government to settle upon a single
theory of guilt and, then, at this final stage, in seizing upon a theory that is inadequate as a
matter of law.”  Id.
66. See 1 DEVITT ET AL., supra note 57, § 16.08 (“A statement, claim or document is
‘fraudulent’ if it was falsely made, or made with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity,
and made or caused to be made with an intent to deceive.”).
67. The term “intent to defraud” has been defined as “act[ing] knowingly and with the
intention or the purpose to deceive or to cheat,” and “is accompanied, ordinarily, by a desire or
a purpose to bring about some gain or benefit to oneself or some other person or by a desire or
a purpose to cause some loss to some person.”  1 id. § 16.07.
68. When defining the term in the context of mail, wire, and bank fraud, it is stated that,
“[t]he phrase [‘any scheme or artifice to defraud’] [‘any scheme or artifice . . . for obtaining
money or property’] means any deliberate plan of action or course of conduct by which
someone intends to deceive or to cheat another or by which someone intends to deprive
another of something of value.”  2 id. § 40.13 (alterations in original).  In the context of
securities fraud, the definition of the term “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” is:
A “device” is an invention, a contrivance, or the result of some plan or design.
A “scheme” is a design or a plan formed to accomplish some purpose.
An “artifice” is an ingenious contrivance or plan of some kind.
There is nothing about the terms “device,” “scheme,” or “artifice” which in
themselves imply anything fraudulent.  The terms are plain English words that are
neutral.
A “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” as used in these instructions, however,
means the forming of some invention, contrivance, plan, or design to trick or to
deceive in order to obtain money or something of value.
2 id. § 52.13.
69. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (coining the
phrase “I know it when I see it” in the context of hard-core pornography).
70. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941).
71. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958).
contrast to these broad definitions, Circuit Judge Edmondson,
writing in the case of United States v. Brown,72 aptly noted that “the
fraud statutes do not cover all behavior which strays from the ideal;
Congress has not yet criminalized all sharp conduct, manipulative
acts, or unethical transactions.”73
The different definitions of criminal fraud emphasize the
importance of determining the boundaries of the term.74
Ascertaining the scope of criminal fraud will not only serve as a
separating point between criminal and civil fraud, but will also
provide the parameters for determining whether criminal fraud is
treated consistently in the federal criminal law.
B. Federal Criminal Law
The scope of fraud is problematic in that there is no specific group
of statutes designated in the federal code as fraud statutes and no
consistent definition to create the boundaries of what is encompassed
within the term.  Three contexts are explored here to discern the
possible limits of the term “fraud.”  The first approach uses specific
terms often associated with fraud to provide a listing of fraud
offenses.  The second examines the use of the term in statistical
reporting methods.  Finally, the third approach considers the
designation of offenses pursuant to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.  Each of these approaches to defining the term fraud is
replete with deficiencies.
1. Terms of art
The terms “fraud,” “fraudulent,” “fraudulently,” or “defraud”
appear within the text of a total of ninety-two substantive statutes in
title 18 of the United States Code.  In some cases more than one of
                                                 
72. 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996).
73. Id. at 1562 (holding that defendants’ conduct did not fall within the federal fraud
statutes).  The court in Brown stated:
Looking at the evidence in this case, our worry is that the criminal fraud statutes were
used to convict four people simply for charging high prices—all allegations of
misconduct in this case involved the price customers paid for their homes, not the
physical qualities of these homes.  The government tries to draw a distinction; they say
these men were convicted for deceptions about these high prices.  For us, at least in
the context of home sales and of the openness of the Florida real estate market, this
distinction is a distinction without meaning.
Id.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 1998) (discussing whether
a fiduciary breach is a criminal fraud).  The court in Bloom stated “if ‘not every breach’ is
criminal fraud where is the line drawn?  Its location cannot be found by parsing § 1341 or
§ 1346 of the mail fraud statute, a profound difficulty in criminal prosecution.”  Id.
these terms appear in the same statute.75  This number is exclusive of
the references found in chapter titles, forfeiture provisions, court
rules, definition sections, and the Sentencing Guidelines appended
to title 18.
Obviously, measuring fraud statutes by the use of these four terms
does not comport with accuracy.  Using “fraud,” “fraudulent,”
“fraudulently,” or “defraud” to identify the criminal fraud statutes
fails to account for statutes that contain attributes of criminal fraud,
but fail to employ one of these terms of art within the language of the
statute.76  Additionally, criminal fraud is not limited to title 18 of the
criminal code.  One finds criminal fraud-related statutes throughout
the United States Code.77
Discerning the list of fraud statutes from the United States Code in
part depends upon how one defines the boundaries of fraud.  An
endless list of questions develops in this process.  For example,
should a violation of the false statement statute be considered
criminal fraud?78  Should fraud encompass offenses involving
                                                 
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (illustrating how the health care fraud
statute uses the terms “defraud” and “fraudulent”).  The use of more than one of these terms in
a criminal statute is not exclusive to title 18.  See 7 U.S.C. § 6(o) (1994) (using the terms “fraud”
and “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” to describe “fraud and misrepresentation by
commodities trading advisors and commodity pool operators”).  In some cases, none of these
words appears in the statute, but one of the terms is used in the chapter title.  The 92
substantive provisions used here are exclusive of the offenses under chapter 47, “Fraud and
False Statements,” which fail to include actual reference to “fraud,” “fraudulent,” “fraudulently,”
or “defraud” within the text of the statute.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1019 (1994) (establishing penalties
for consular officers who knowingly make false certifications).
76. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 912 provides:
Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the
authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as
such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper,
document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 912 (1994).  In some cases the statute itself does not use one of these four fraud
terms, but is located under chapter 47, which is titled “Fraud and False Statements.”  See id.
§ 1007 (“Whoever, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, knowingly makes or invites reliance on a false, forged, or counterfeit
statement, document, or thing shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . , or both.”).  Statutes with
attributes of fraud, but failing to employ one of these four terms can also be found outside of
title 18.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1994) (setting a criminal penalty for an “attempt to evade or
defeat tax”).  In United States v. Helmsley, the court noted that “[s]ection 7201 of the Internal
Revenue Code, [is] the ‘capstone’ of the comprehensive statutory scheme prohibiting and
punishing federal tax fraud . . . .”  941 F.2d 71, 99 (2d Cir. 1991).  Section 7201 of title 26, does
not, however, include one of these four fraud-related terms.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
77. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441h (1994) (barring federal candidates or their employees and
agents from fraudulently misrepresenting themselves); 7 U.S.C. § 6(o) (1994) (prohibiting
“fraud and misrepresentation by commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, and
associated persons”); 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (1994 & Supp. 1997) (establishing penalties for engaging
in document fraud of citizenship, naturalization, and expatriation papers).
78. A Department of Justice manual discusses the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1994 & Supp. 1997), under the topic of “Fraud Against the Government.”  See U.S. DEP’T OF
counterfeiting and forgery?79  Does fraud include some offenses
related to official corruption, and, if so, will it include bribery
offenses?80  Will we reach a point of saying that most crimes not
involving assaultive behavior, include an element of fraudulent
conduct?
2. Statistical reporting
Statistical reporting provides a second possible approach to
defining fraud.  In reporting federal judicial workload statistics for
criminal cases81 and criminal defendants82 by major offenses, one of
the specified categories is fraud.  Here one finds that fraud does not
include larceny and theft, embezzlement, or forgery and
counterfeiting.83  Federal judicial workload statistics also do not
include bribery, which is listed within the category of miscellaneous
                                                 
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-42.100 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. Attorney’s
Manual].
79. Counterfeiting and forgery are not considered fraud for purposes of statistical
reporting.  See infra text accompanying note 83 (mentioning that counterfeiting and forgery
offenses were excluded from the Department of Justice’s judicial workload statistics for criminal
cases).  Counterfeiting and forgery are, however, included under Part F of the sentencing
guidelines.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUEL § 2F1.1 (1998); see also infra note 96 and
accompanying text.  Examining a statute in the counterfeiting and forgery section of title 18
provides argument for classifying the crime a “fraud” crime.  Section 472 of title 18, “Uttering
counterfeit obligations or securities,” provides:
Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts to pass,
utter, publish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States or keeps in
possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or
other security of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than fifteen years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 472 (1994).
While chapter 25 of title 18 is designated as “Counterfeiting and Forgery,” chapter 47 is titled
“Fraud and False Statements” and chapter 63 is named “Mail Fraud.”  The titles, however, do
not necessarily encompass the crimes included therein.  For example, one finds the health care
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (1994 & Supp. 1997), and the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (1994), under the general category of mail fraud.  The disorganization of the Code is
highlighted when noting that computer fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. 1997), and
major fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (1994), are found within chapter 47, “Fraud and False
Statements,” while wire fraud, id. § 1343, is found within chapter 63, “Mail Fraud.”  This
classification system can perhaps be explained in that health care fraud, bank fraud, and wire
fraud offenses were modeled after the mail fraud statute, whereas computer fraud and major
fraud bear little resemblance to mail fraud.
80. Although 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994) can be considered essentially a bribery or theft
statute, it has also been referred to as the “program fraud statute.”  See United States v. LaHue,
998 F. Supp. 1182, 1184-85 (D. Kan. 1998) (equating program fraud to defrauding the U.S.
Government).
81. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD
STATISTICS 52-54 (1993) (providing a table of “Criminal Cases Commenced by Major
Offenses”).
82. See id. at 55-57 (displaying a table of “Criminal Defendants Commenced by Major
Offense”).
83. See id. at 53, 56.
general offenses.84
The reporting of federal judicial workload statistics includes several
subcategories under fraud.  For example, false claims and statements
are considered within the fraud category.85  Income tax fraud is also
included as a subcategory of fraud.86  The federal judicial workload
statistics do not limit fraud to statutes found in title 18 of the United
States Code.87
The United States Department of Justice, however, does not
designate fraud using the same criteria used in the judicial workload
statistics.88  Fraud statistics here exclude tax offenses which are
reported under “[p]ublic-order, other offenses.”89  Fraud is one of
several subcategories under the category of fraudulent offenses,
which is a subcategory of property offenses.90  Like the federal judicial
workload statistics, however, these fraud statistics do not include
counterfeiting and forgery.91
3. Sentencing guidelines
The sentencing guidelines offer a new approach to the “concept”
of fraud.92  The guidelines categorize offenses into groups for
                                                 
84. See id. at 54, 57.
85. See id. at 53, 56.
86. See id.
87. See id.  The subcategories under fraud are:  “income tax, lending institution, postal,
veterans and allotments, securities and exchange, social security, false personation, nationality
laws, passport fraud, false claims and statements, and other.”  Id.  These same categories were
used under fraud in prior reports of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  See 1990
ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 196, 198 (providing a table of offenses
committed by criminal defendants).
88. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 634 (1996).  The United States Department of Justice defines fraud in
judicial workload situations as follows:
[U]nlawfully depriving a person of his or her property or legal rights through
intentional misrepresentation of fact or deceit other than forgery or counterfeiting.
Includes violations of statutes pertaining to lending and credit institutions, the Postal
Service, interstate wire, radio, television, computer, creditcard [sic], veterans benefits,
allotments, bankruptcy, marketing agreements, commodity credit, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, railroad retirement, unemployment, Social Security, false
personation, citizenship, passports, conspiracy, and claims and statements, excluding
tax fraud.  The category excludes fraud involving tax violations that are shown in a
separate category under “Public-order, other offenses.”
Id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 436, 438 (providing various tables of offenses investigated by federal
authorities).
91. See id. at 634.
92. See Brickey, supra note 43, at 166 n.24 (citing Robert H. Joost, Viewing the Sentencing
Guidelines as a Product of the Federal Criminal Code Effort, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 118, 120
(1994)).  In describing the “sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and commentary,” Robert
H. Joost states:  “[T]hey are, in my opinion, a Federal Criminal Code, albeit limited in scope.
They fit the definition of a code of law, and they impact many aspects of federal criminal law.”
Id. at 119 (quoting Joost, supra).
purposes of sentencing.  For example, separate parts exist for
“Offenses Involving Drugs,”93  “Offenses Involving Antitrust,”94 and
“Offenses Involving Taxation.”95
Part F of the sentencing guidelines is designated “Fraud and
Deceit.”  The two sections included within Part F are:  2F1.1 (“Fraud
and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit
Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the
United States”) and 2F1.2 (“Insider Trading”).96  The commentary to
these two sections references the statutory provisions covered under
2F1.1 and 2F1.2 and notes that an appendix contains additional
statutory provisions.97  In examining this statutory appendix, one
finds 195 statutory references to section 2F1.1 and four statutory
references to 2F1.2.98  In several instances a statute uses one of these
two guidelines in conjunction with another designated guideline.99
The statutory reference provides some flexibility in determining the
appropriate guideline to be used for sentencing a defendant.100
Using Part F to capture the concept of fraud distinguishes fraud
from offenses involving “theft, embezzlement, receipt of stolen
property, and property destruction.”101  Thus, sentencing for a
violation of the computer fraud statute may in some instances require
                                                 
93. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D (1998) (title in all capitals in original).
94. Id. § 2R (title in all capitals in original).
95. Id. § 2T (title in all capitals in original).
96. Id. §§ 2F.1, 2F.2 (titles in all capitals in original).  Throughout the sentencing
guidelines, there are references to the monetary table found within guideline 2F1.1.  For
example, guideline § 2B5.3 (“Criminal Infringement of Copyright or Trademark”) states that
“[i]f the retail value of the infringing items exceeded $2,000, increase by the corresponding
number of levels from the table in § 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit).”  Id. § 2B5.3.
97. See id. § 2F1.1 cmt.  In Stinson v. United States, the Court held “that commentary in the
Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that
guideline.”  508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
98. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. a.
99. The introduction to appendix A notes that “[i]f more than one guideline section is
referenced for the particular statute, use the guideline most appropriate for the nature of the
offense conduct charged in the count of which the defendant was convicted.”  Id. app. a, intro.
100. See id. (“If, in an atypical case, the guideline section, indicated for the statute of
conviction is inappropriate because of the particular conduct involved, use the guideline
section most applicable to the nature of the offense conduct charged in the count of which the
defendant was convicted.  (See § 1B1.2).”).
101. See id. §§ 2F; 2B1.1 intro. (stating that Part B addresses only the basic forms of property
offenses and does not include fraud).  However, a consolidated theft, property destruction, and
fraud guideline may alleviate the issue of viewing fraud as a distinct offense under Part F.  See
The Economic Crime Package, 64 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 191 (Dec. 9, 1998) (describing the
proposed amendments to the sentencing guidelines which would consolidate theft, fraud, and
property destruction guidelines).  Questions can also arise as to whether it is appropriate to use
a fraud or bribery guideline.  See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 841-42 (11th Cir.
1998) (finding that the district court erred in using the fraud guideline as opposed to the
guideline for bribery of a public official).
a fraud guideline,102 in other instances fall under a theft guideline,103
and in some cases require the application of an espionage
guideline.104  This appears warranted in instances where the computer
fraud truly involves espionage activity.  The designation of a
misappropriation of a trade secret as theft, as opposed to fraud, may
be somewhat more controversial.105
Using the term fraud as applied in the sentencing guidelines does
not, however, offer an accurate structure for examining the concept
of fraud.106  Many of the classic fraud offenses are omitted from Part F
(“Offenses Involving Fraud and Deceit”).  For example, Part F does
not include conspiracies to defraud the government,107 fraud
involving deprivations of intangible rights to honest services by public
officials,108 tax fraud,109 or marriage fraud to evade immigration law.110
                                                 
102. Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) and 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) (computer fraud)
generally require the application of sentencing guideline 2F1.1.  See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. a, § 2F1.1.
103. A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) generally requires the application of sentencing
guideline 2B1.1 (larceny, embezzlement and other forms of theft).  See id., app. a, § 2B1.1.
104. A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) generally requires the application of sentencing
guideline 2M3.2 (“Gathering National Defense Information”).  See id. app. a, § 2M3.2.
105. The theft guideline 2B1.1 specifically provides for a two-level increase when the offense
involves the “misappropriation of a trade secret and the defendant knew or intended that the
offense would benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.”  See
id. § 2B1.1(b)(7).  In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court found that
intangible property such as confidential business information would be property under the mail
fraud statute.  See id. at 28.  Mail fraud, however, is sentenced under the fraud provisions of
guideline 2F1.1 unless the fraud involves the deprivation of the intangible right of honest
services.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. a, § 2F1.1.  In the latter instance,
sentencing is pursuant to guideline 2C1.7.  See id. app. a, § 2C1.7.
106. Offenses involving what is classically considered fraud activity, however, may be
grouped together for purposes of sentencing.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 3D1.2(d) (“All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a
single group.”).
107. “Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Government Functions,” prosecuted
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371 falls under guideline 2C1.7.  See id. app. a, § 2C1.7.
108. Sentences for mail, wire, and bank frauds involving a deprivation of the intangible
right to honest services would generally fall under guideline 2C1.7.  See id. app. a, § 2C1.7.
109. Tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1994), and fraud and false tax statements, id. § 7206,
require the application of guideline 2T1.1 (“Tax Evasion; Willful Failure to File Return, Supply
Information, or Pay Tax; Fraudulent or False Returns, Statements, or Other Documents”).  See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. a, § 2T1.1.  In some instances, violations of the
fraud and false tax statements statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7206, guideline 2S1.3 (“Structuring
Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements; Failure to Report Cash or Monetary
Transactions; Failure to File Currency and Monetary Instrument Report; Knowingly Filing False
Reports”) applies.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. a, § 2S1.3.  Some tax statutes
do, however, use the fraud guideline for sentencing purposes.  See id. app. a (stating that 26
U.S.C. § 7208, “Offenses relating to stamps,” requires the application of guideline § 2F1.1).
110. Marriage fraud, 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997), is sentenced under guideline
2L2.1 (“Trafficking in a Document Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or Legal Resident
Status, or a United States Passport; False Statement in Respect to the Citizenship or
Immigration Status of Another; Fraudulent Marriage to Assist Alien to Evade Immigration
Law”) or 2L2.2 (“Fraudulently Acquiring Documents Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or
Legal Resident Status for Own Use; False Personation or Fraudulent Marriage by Alien to Evade
Some fraud-related offenses are completely omitted from the
guidelines.111
Examining the concept of fraud in the federal system cannot be
accomplished simply by referencing fraud-related offenses in the
United States Code because fraud does not always operate as a
discrete entity.  Fraud also exists as part of offenses that provide
increased criminality for multiple conduct.  For example, fraud
offenses, such as mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud, all serve as
predicate offenses for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (“RICO”) Act charge.112  Certain fraud offenses can also
constitute “specified unlawful activity” for the purposes of a money
laundering charge.113
C. Model Penal Code
Despite the pervasiveness of the term “fraud” in today’s federal
criminal statutes, its appearance in the American Law Institute’s
Model Penal Code is limited.  Although the Model Penal Code is not
a federal code,114 its treatment of the concept of fraud offers some
guidance.  There is no general fraud statute within the Model Penal
Code, nor are there mail or wire fraud provisions.  Further, the
criminal conspiracy section of the Model Penal Code is limited to
conspiracies to commit crimes, as opposed to conspiracies to defraud
the government.115  The term “fraud” surfaces mainly in Article 224,
the “Forgery and Fraudulent Practices” section of the Model Penal
Code.116  Here one finds specific fraud-related statutes, as opposed to
generic provisions.  For example, one finds the term “fraud,”
                                                 
Immigration Law; Fraudulently Acquiring or Improperly Using a United States Passport”).  See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. a, §§ 2L2.1, 2L2.2.
111. There is no statutory reference to 2 U.S.C. § 441(h) (1994), the penalty provisions of 2
U.S.C. § 437(g), which criminalizes the fraudulent misrepresentation of campaign authority.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. a.  Also omitted is the recently added
bankruptcy fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. a.
See id.  Appendix A of the sentencing guidelines does provide that “[f]or those offenses not
listed in this index, the most analogous guideline is to be applied.”  Id. intro.
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
113. See id. § 1956.  In United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1997), the
prosecution unsuccessfully attempted to prove that an ophthalmologist’s entire practice was
based on fraud, using “three contexts”:  “before the jury to prove the § 1957 monetary
transaction counts; before the jury to sustain the criminal forfeiture; and before the court at
sentencing to establish loss.”  See id. at 1058.
114. See Brickey, supra note 43, at 168 (“[F]ederal criminal law is not (and never has been)
the tidy mix of homicide, theft, and burglary found in state criminal codes.”).
115. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1980) (criminalizing concerted efforts on the part of
two or more persons to commit a crime, while making no mention of the government as the
target of the conspiracy).
116. See id. § 224.
“fraudulent” or “defraud” used in statutes of “Forgery,”117 “Simulating
Objects of Antiquity, Rarity, Etc.,”118 “Fraudulent Destruction,
Removal or Concealment of Recordable Instruments,”119 “Defrauding
Secured Creditors,”120 and “Fraud in Insolvency.”121  Other sections
which appear under the category of “Forgery and Fraudulent
Practices,” although not directly using the term “fraud,” imply
fraudulent conduct by the specific conduct proscribed by the
statute.122  The fraud statutes of the Model Penal Code, however, have
specific objects of the offenses, as opposed to unlimited generic
fraudulent conduct.123  Specificity, however, does not always provide
sufficient definition for interpreting the legislation.124
II. FRAUD AS THE OBJECT OF THE OFFENSE
Fraud is the common denominator found in all fraud offenses.
Each statute, however, has a different object upon which the fraud is
predicated.125  If one examines existing federal fraud statutes from the
perspective of the subject matter of the fraud, the statutes can be
placed on a spectrum demonstrating the varying levels of emphasis
placed on this object of the fraud.
At one end of the spectrum, one finds what can be labeled generic
fraud statutes.  Here the focus of the statute is almost exclusively on
the fraud and not on the object of the offense.  For example, the
                                                 
117. See id. § 224.1.
118. See id. § 224.2 (stating that it is a misdemeanor knowingly to make an object appear
valuable because of antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship when it is not in fact valuable).
119. See id. § 224.3 (stating that it is a crime to destroy, remove, or conceal any writing for
which the law provides public recording).
120. See id. § 224.10 (making it a crime to conceal, remove, or destroy property subject to a
security interest).
121. See id. § 224.11 (criminalizing the act of destroying, removing, or concealing one’s own
property for the purpose of obstructing the claim of any creditor).
122. See, e.g., id. § 224.6 (“Credit Cards”); id. § 224.7 (“Deceptive Business Practices”); id.
§ 223.3 (“Theft by Deception”).
123. Even the “Deceptive Business Practices” statute is limited to seven specific types of
deceptive conduct.  See id. § 224.7.  For example, one will be engaged in a deceptive business
practice and will be subject to criminal prosecution if, “in the course of business he uses or
possesses for use a false weight or measure, or any other device for falsely determining or
recording any quality or quantity.”  See id. § 224.7(1).
124. Specificity can result in increased complexity that can impede understanding a statute.
George P. Fletcher noted that “[i]t is almost as though the drafters wanted the Model Penal
Code to resemble a panoply of tax regulations.  Criminal codes are not written for erudite
specialists.  They should be written so that average people and average lawyers and judges can
understand their terms.”  George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 3, 9 (1998).
125. For example, in the Model Penal Code there are specific criminal offenses for
committing fraud in the course of running a business, using the credit card of another, and
committing forgery.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.2 (“Simulating Objects of Antiquity,
Rarity, Etc.”); id. § 224.6 (“Credit Cards”); id. § 224.7 (“Deceptive Business Practices”).
mails (or the interstate carrier) provide a necessary jurisdictional
hook for employing the mail fraud statute, but offer no other
significantly meaningful aspect to the offense.126  A vast array of
fraudulent conduct can be prosecuted under the mail fraud statute.
The emphasis of the crime of mail fraud is the fraudulent conduct as
opposed to the mailing.127
In contrast, one finds at the opposite end of the spectrum specific
fraud statutes, that narrowly focus on the object of the fraud.
Although fraud is required for prosecution of bankruptcy fraud, the
conduct that may be prosecuted is constrained by the specific object
of the statute, namely, bankruptcy matters.128  Although the method
of fraud and the harm caused may be universal, the subject matter of
the fraud limits the boundaries of the conduct encompassed by the
statute.  Specificity can be influenced by context, limitations on the
transactions, and limitations on the victims the statute seeks to
protect.
Statutory interpretation, however, has not remained constant.
Statutes that were enacted with a specific focus have in some cases
developed broadly, allowing prosecutors increased accessibility in
prosecuting new frauds.129  Thus, although statutes may be
categorized as generic or specific, it must be remembered that the
fluid nature of fraud, coupled with judicial interpretation, may move
a statute from being specifically focused to being generically
applied.130  Placement on the spectrum can be a function of generic
or specific language employed by the legislature in drafting the
statute.131  It can also result from judicial interpretation that
emphasizes either the fraud component or, alternatively, the object
                                                 
126. See George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption—Mail Fraud, State Law, and Post-
Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 254 (1997) (explaining that federal prosecutors often
charge alleged offenders with the crime of mail fraud, as a means of prosecuting what would
otherwise be a state criminal offense, despite the fact that the use of the mails is merely incident
to a larger fraudulent enterprise).
127. See id. (“A small tail—a relatively insignificant mailing that is somehow related to a
broader range of actions—can wag a very large dog.”).  One can argue that the Supreme Court
in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), limited the object by requiring a deprivation of
“money or property.”  See id. at 360.  Congress, however, in reaction to this decision, added
section 1346 to title 18, which allows the prosecution for mail fraud beyond deprivation of
money or property by defining “scheme or artifice to defraud” to include “a scheme or artifice
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”  18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994); see also
infra notes 161-82 and accompanying text.
128. See infra note 191 (outlining the bankruptcy statute).
129. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (describing the development of the mail
fraud statute from a specific to a generic fraud statute).
130. See, e.g., id. (discussing the development of the mail fraud statute from a specific to a
generic fraud statute).
131. See infra Parts II.A-B (discussing the different approaches of generic and specific fraud
statutes).
of the fraud.132
Fraud statutes are selected here to demonstrate the varying levels
of emphasis that can be placed upon the object of the fraud.  From
these examples, varying methods that can be used to restrict generic
fraud statutes become apparent.  This Article argues the necessity of
focusing on the object of the offense, as opposed to the fraud
component.
A. Generic Fraud Statutes
1. Conspiracy to defraud
Conspiracy offenses exist throughout the United States Code.133
The general conspiracy statute134 criminalizes conspiracies to commit
any offense against the United States and also criminalizes
conspiracies to defraud the United States.135  Unlike a conspiracy to
commit any offense against the United States, a conspiracy to defraud
does not require agreement to violate a specific statute.136
Judge Learned Hand aptly described the federal conspiracy statute
as “that darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.”137  Conspiracy to
defraud is perhaps the broadest of the fraud offenses.138  The breadth
                                                 
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (governing conspiracy against rights); 18
U.S.C. § 224 (1994) (criminalizing the act of conspiring to influence a sporting contest through
bribery).
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).  This statute, “Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
United States,” provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is
a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the
maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
Id.
135. See id.  A conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit any offense
against the United States, although encompassed within the same statute, are two separate
prohibitions.  See United States v. Ashley, 905 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that
section 371 criminalizes two different types of conspiracies).
136. See United States v. Terranova, 7 F. Supp. 989, 990 (N.D. Cal. 1934) (stating that, in
order to constitute conspiracy to defraud the United States, “it is not necessary that the
conspiracy should have been to commit an act in violation of a criminal statute”).  Conspiracy
to commit a specific offense also does not require “that the United States or an agency thereof
was an intended victim of the conspiracy.”  United States v. Falcone, 960 F.2d 988, 990 (11th
Cir. 1992).
137. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
138. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 408 (“In combination, ‘conspiracy’ and ‘defraud’ have
assumed such broad and imprecise proportions as to trench not only on the act requirement
but also on the standards of fair trial and on constitutional prohibitions against vagueness and
double jeopardy.”).
of the conspiracy statute is in part a function of the lack of specific
definition for the term “defraud the United States.”139  As Professor
Abraham Goldstein noted:  “The phrase has had no fixed
meaning.”140
Enacted in 1867, the initial conspiracy statute141 was one section of
an act focused on internal revenue.142  In United States v. Hirsch,143 the
Supreme Court authorized an expansive reading of the statute to
include conspiracies unrelated to the revenue laws.144  In Haas v.
Henkel,145 the Court stated that “[t]he statute is broad enough in its
terms to include any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing,
obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any department of
government.”146  The Court also held that “it is not essential to charge
or prove an actual financial or property loss . . . .”147
There are, however, some limitations to the statute.  For example,
theft by violence, burglary, and robbery are not considered to be
fraud for purposes of the conspiracy to defraud statute.148  Also,
                                                 
139. See id. at 417 (noting that “defraud the United States” has not had a “fixed meaning”);
Steven D. Gordon, The Liability of Colleges and Universities for Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federally
Funded Grants and Projects, 75 EDUC. L. REP. (West) 13, 19 (Aug. 1992) (“The concept of
defrauding the United States has become so elastic over the years that it can potentially
encompass any conduct which a court views as ‘collusive and dishonest’ if some federal rule or
regulation was violated in the process.”).
140. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 417.
141. See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 468, 484 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1994)) (prohibiting conspiracy to defraud the United States “in any matter or for
any purpose”); see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987) (“Section 371 is the
descendent of and bears a strong resemblance to conspiracy laws that have been in the federal
statute books since 1867.”).
142. The Act was titled “An Act to amend existing Laws relating to Internal Revenue, and
for other Purposes.”  Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 471 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.); see Goldstein, supra note 8, at 418 (explaining that the conspiracy
provision in the law was initially aimed at conspiracies either to commit offenses against the
internal revenue or to defraud the United States of internal revenue).
143. 100 U.S. 33 (1879).
144. In Hirsch the Court stated:
Since, then, the section does not mention the revenue or the revenue laws, but in
terms includes every form of conspiracy against the United States, and every form of
conspiracy to defraud them, it is difficult to see how the crimes it defines, and which
are punishable under it, can be said to arise under the revenue laws.
Id. at 35.
145. 216 U.S. 462 (1910) (involving a scheme to obtain secret government information
regarding the market price of certain commodities and to use that information for purposes of
speculation).
146. Id. at 479.
147. Id. at 480.
148. In Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924), the Court stated:
To conspire to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the Government
out of property or money, but it also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its
lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are
dishonest.  It is not necessary that the Government shall be subjected to property or
pecuniary loss by the fraud, but only that its legitimate official action and purpose
shall be defeated by misrepresentation, chicane, or the overreaching of those charged
section 371’s language “the United States or any agency thereof”149 is
not synonymous with “anyone receiving federal financial assistance
and supervision.”150  In Tanner v. United States,151 the Court emphasized
the necessity that the United States be the “target” of the fraud.152
One, however, who uses “innocent individuals and businesses to
reach and defraud the United States is not for that reason beyond the
scope of § 371.”153
The pervasiveness of the offense of “conspiracy to defraud” is a
function of a fraud object that offers few restraints.154  Lack of a clear
definition of “defraud” permits prosecutions of a wide array of
conduct.155  The amorphous definition of “defraud” translates into
making conspiracy to defraud a generic statute.156
2. Mail fraud
The mail fraud statute157 also portrays an extreme on the spectrum,
                                                 
with carrying out the governmental intention.  It is true that words “to defraud” as
used in some statutes have been given a wide meaning, wider than their ordinary
scope.  They usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit,
chicane or overreaching.  They do not extend to theft by violence.  They refer rather
to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes.  One would
not class robbery or burglary among frauds.
Id. at 188.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
150. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 132 (1987), on remand sub nom. United States v.
Conover, 845 F.2d 266, 267 (11th Cir. 1988) (“A conspiracy to defraud Seminole, a private
corporation receiving financial assistance and minimal supervision from the United States
Government is not itself a conspiracy ‘to defraud the United States.’”).
151. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
152. See id. at 130 (noting that the conspiracies to defraud criminalized under section 371
are defined, in part, by the target of the conspiracy—the United States).
153. Id. at 129.
154. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 408 (claiming that “conspiracy to defraud” has taken on
a broad meaning).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 765 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Involvement in a
scheme for financial quid pro quos in federally financed contracts or to receive unjust
enrichment charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.”); United States v. Steinmetz, 643 F. Supp.
537, 543 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that conspiracies to defraud the Internal Revenue Service
are indictable under section 371).
156. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 441 (“All the evils against which the ‘void for vagueness’
doctrine is said to guard exist in ‘conspiracy to defraud the United States’ as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.”).  It can be argued that specific language within a single statute could never
encompass the array of possible conduct included in the current conspiracy to defraud statute.
See id. at 441-48.
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).  Section 1341, the “Frauds and swindles” statute, provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated
or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
demonstrating an almost exclusive emphasis on the fraud as opposed
to the object of the offense.  When initially enacted in 1872, mail
fraud was not a generic fraud statute.158  The statute constituted
merely one section within the Postal Act.159  In its inception, the
emphasis was on the “mailing” element of the statute, as opposed to
the “scheme to defraud.”160  Protection of the “post-office
establishment of the United States” was the focus of the statute.161
Over time, mail fraud has become a generic fraud statute.162  Both
legislative modifications and subsequent judicial interpretations have
resulted in expanding the scope of fraud and diminishing the
mailing element of the statute.163  Where the object of the offense, the
mailing, was initially emphasized, the development of the statute has
resulted in the fraud element consuming the statute.164
Two examples of statutory modifications to mail fraud emphasize
the legislative expansion of the fraud aspect of the statute.  In 1988,
Congress enacted a statute defining the term “scheme or artifice to
defraud” to allow prosecutions premised upon a deprivation of the
“intangible right of honest services.”165  In 1994, Congress again
modified the statute, inserting the language “or deposits or causes to
be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
a private or commercial interstate carrier.”166  This latter amendment
permits prosecutions of mail fraud absent a post office mailing.167
                                                 
Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed
to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.  If the
violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
158. See Podgor, supra note 25, at 225 (noting that in 1872, mail fraud was defined as “a
scheme of artifice” to defraud U.S. postal institutions).
159. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323, superceded by Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 763 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
160. See Rakoff, supra note 25, at 784 (explaining that under the 1872 law, punishment was
based less on the degree of fraud and more  on the degree of misuse of the mails).
161. See Moohr, supra note 54, at 1150-52 (describing how the Supreme Court reduced the
substantive element of the mailing requirement early in the statute’s history).
162. See Henning, supra note 8, at 438 (explaining that use of the mail fraud statute has
shifted away from the statute’s original purpose of protecting against misuse of the mails).
163. See infra note 167 and accompanying text (noting that a defendant can be prosecuted
for mail fraud without mailing anything through the U.S. Postal Service).
164. See Henning, supra note 8, at 439.
165. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)).
166. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (expanding the scope of the law to apply not only to fraud
Increasing the breadth of fraud while de-emphasizing the
requirement of a mailing is also a product of judicial interpretation.
For example, the breadth of fraud covered by the mail fraud statute
was expanded when the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States168
permitted prosecutions of mail fraud premised upon intangible
property.169  The Court, likewise, in Pereira v. United States,170 limited
the importance of the statute’s mailing aspect by stating that the
mailing did not have to be an essential part of the scheme to
defraud.171  Routine mailings,172 “innocent mailings,”173 and mailings
that are “counterproductive”174 to the scheme to defraud are allowed
to be used as the basis for the mailing element of a mail fraud
prosecution.  The mails are a mere jurisdictional hook which permits
the prosecution of fraudulent schemes.175  The diminished role of the
mailing is highlighted by the fact that a postal mailing is no longer
required when the delivery is via an interstate carrier.176
An incredible array of schemes have been prosecuted under the
mail fraud statute.177  One finds, for example, “divorce mill” fraud,178
                                                 
involving the U.S. Postal Service, but to private carriers as well); see also Henning, supra note 8,
at 439 (noting that the mail fraud statute no longer punishes only the use of the U.S. Postal
Service to execute a fraudulent scheme, but also private methods of delivery through interstate
carriers).
168. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
169. See id. at 25 (expanding the definition of “property” to include intangible property in
a case involving alleged confidential business information).
170. 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
171. See id. at 8 (“It is not necessary that the scheme contemplate the use of the mails as an
essential element.”).  It is sufficient if use of the mails is “incident to an essential part of the
scheme.”  See id.
172. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 28 (rejecting the argument that using a routine mailing to
“execute the scheme at issue” did not satisfy the mail and wire fraud statutes).
173. See United States v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1986) (commenting that as
long as the defendant knew that mailings were to be used in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme, it does not matter that the mailings were done in the ordinary course of business).
174. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989) (“The relevant question at all
times is whether the mailing is part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the
perpetrator at the time, regardless of whether the mailing later, through hindsight, may prove
to have been counterproductive and return to haunt the perpetrator of the fraud.”).
175. See generally Moohr, supra note 25, at 162 (describing the mailing as a “jurisdictional
factor” that allows great leeway for prosecutors); Podgor, supra note 25, at 229 (claiming that
the mailing itself is merely the “jurisdictional object” that allows prosecution under the mail
fraud statute).  But cf. Henning, supra note 8, at 437 (commenting on the “malleability” of the
mail fraud statute in that prosecutors can bring indictments under it without worrying about
“jurisdictional restrictions”).
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (affirming that mail fraud includes any fraudulent or
attempted fraudulent scheme that utilizes either private or commercial delivery services).
177. See Podgor, supra note 25, at 226-29 (describing the evolution of the phrase “scheme to
defraud” in 18 U.S.C. § 1341 to now encompass a plethora of possible schemes that might be
prosecuted under the statute).
178. See United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming the lower
court’s finding that defendants were guilty of mail fraud if it was found that their promise to
mail valid divorce papers for a fee was a scheme to defraud).
insurance fraud,179 securities fraud,180 and franchise fraud.181  Few
restrictions have been placed on what will be subject to prosecution
under this statute.182  Restraints have been implemented, however,
where prosecutors have attempted to use novel approaches in
presenting their mail fraud case.183  Despite some judicial restraint
placed upon the development of the fraud aspect of the mail fraud
statute, in modern days it has lived up to Justice Burger’s sentiment
that mail fraud should be the “stopgap device to deal on a temporary
basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized legislation can
be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.”184
3. Wire fraud
The wire fraud statute,185 enacted in 1952,186 operates parallel to
mail fraud.187  Like mail fraud, the use of the wires allows an
enormous breadth of conduct to be included within its realm. In
contrast to mail fraud, however, wire fraud did not develop from a
specific fraud statute into one with a generic application.  Wire fraud
                                                 
179. See United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1994) (involving a prosecution for
mail fraud where defendant used the mail to deliver an alleged false insurance claim).
180. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-28 (1987) (concerning a conviction
under the mail and wire statutes for alleged insider use of a Wall Street Journal investment advice
column, co-authored by one of the defendants, to gain an advantage in the stock market).
181. See United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737, 749 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming the conviction
of defendants for mail fraud which arose out of the sale of merchandise franchises).
182. See Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926) (holding that a scheme to defraud
does not include threats of murder or bodily harm); see also Podgor, supra note 41, at 560
(looking at the recent judicial decisions that have restricted prosecution under the mail fraud
statute).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1997) (contending that
an alleged scheme to defraud the government of contracts was insufficient for mail fraud);
United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 669 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding insufficient evidence to
satisfy the elements of mail fraud where a bond underwriter had no duty to, and in fact did not,
disclose to an issuer that the underwriter received a commission); United States v. Brown, 79
F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996) (ruling that an alleged exaggeration of market prices is not a
sufficient scheme to defraud); see also Podgor, supra note 41, at 560 (noting recent judicial
decisions where mail fraud convictions have been reversed).
184. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
185. “Fraud by wire, radio, or television,” 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994), states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings,
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.  If the
violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
186. Communication Act Amendments of 1952, ch. 879, § 18(a), 66 Stat. 711, 722 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994)).
187. See United States v. Fermin Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194, 1198 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[I]n general,
case law construing § 1341 is instructive for purposes of § 1343.”).
from its inception has been generic.
The judiciary has offered few restrictions to the interstate wire
aspect of the wire fraud statute.188  The jurisdictional base used for
prosecution under this offense, the wires, is a mere jurisdictional
hook required for federal prosecution.189  Like mail fraud, wire fraud
appears on the extreme end of the spectrum with the focus of the
statute being the fraud and the object of the offense having an
insignificant role in the criminality.
B. Specific Fraud Statutes
Wire fraud is not the only statute modeled after the mail fraud
statute.190  While wire fraud is premised on a neutral object which
allows for the prosecution of an array of conduct, other statutes
modeled after the mail fraud statute reference a subject which serves
to narrow their application.  For example, bankruptcy fraud requires
the bankruptcy context for application of the statute191 and health
                                                 
188. See Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1366 (5th Cir. 1988).  In Ayres, the Fifth Circuit stated
that, “[a]lthough this circuit never has faced an indictment or complaint alleging federal wire-
fraud on the basis of telephone calls made within a single state, our rulings consistently have
presumed that purely intrastate communication would be beyond the statute’s reach.”  Id.  Wire
fraud was found not to be an acceptable charge where the alleged scheme to defraud was a
deprivation of a foreign government of its taxes.  See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 586
(1st Cir. 1996) (reasoning that section 1343 would not apply to defendants because the alleged
scheme involved defrauding a foreign government).  But see United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d
547, 553 (2d Cir. 1997) (maintaining that the mere fact that a scheme consisted of defrauding a
foreign government of taxes did not make defendants exempt from wire fraud charges).
Courts have also restricted wire fraud where the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the
offense.  See United States v. Beckner, 134 F.3d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining that there
was insufficient evidence of aiding and abetting a client’s alleged criminal intent to defraud).
189. See United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d 370, 374 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[A]ccused need not
know or foresee that the communication was interstate.”).  But see United States v. Bentz, 21
F.3d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the government provided insufficient evidence that the
defendant should reasonably have foreseen the use of the wires).
190. Some courts have noted that although there are similarities between the mail and wire
fraud statutes and newer fraud statutes, differences may still exist.  For example, courts have
distinguished the bank fraud statute and the major fraud statute from the mail and wire fraud
statutes in their use of the term “execute.”  See United States v. Wiehl, 904 F. Supp. 81, 87-88
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the major fraud statute punishes “each execution of a scheme to
defraud the government,” and not individual acts contained in each execution).
191. See 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).  Section 157 provides:
A person who, having devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud
and for the purpose of executing or concealing such a scheme or artifice or
attempting to do so—
(1) files a petition under title 11;
(2) files a document in a proceeding under title 11; or
(3) makes a false or fraudulent representation, claim, or promise concerning or
in relation to a proceeding under title 11, at any time before or after the filing of
the petition, or in relation to a proceeding falsely asserted to be pending under
such title,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
Id.  Bankruptcy fraud has also been prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 152, a statute which does not
care fraud requires a “health care benefit program.”192  These statutes
are more limited than mail and wire fraud because the nature of the
object serves to constrain the conduct which can be prosecuted.
Both bankruptcy fraud and health care fraud, however, include the
language of a “scheme or artifice to defraud” within the statute.193
Other fraud statutes may offer a specific object while having little
resemblance to the mail fraud statute.  For example, section 10(b) of
the Securities Act of 1934194 and its accompanying Rule 10b-5195 have
been a common statutory basis for the prosecution of securities
fraud.196  Likewise, the marriage fraud statute does not contain the
                                                 
use the phrase “scheme or artifice to defraud.”  See United States v. Spencer, 129 F.3d 246, 249
(2d Cir. 1997) (affirming a bankruptcy fraud conviction based on defendant’s scheme to
launder money from a bankrupt airline); United States v. McIntosh, 124 F.3d 1330, 1334 (10th
Cir. 1997) (premising bankruptcy fraud on concealment pursuant to section 152(7), which
punishes anyone who conceals property, both knowingly and fraudulently, with the intent to
circumvent the provisions of the bankruptcy code).
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (1994 & Supp. 1997).  Section 1347 provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice—
(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or
control of, any health care benefit program,
in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or
services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
If the violation results in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title),
such person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both; and if the violation results in death, such person shall be fined under this title,
or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both.
Id.
193. Both bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157, and health care fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1347, refer to a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”  Limiting bankruptcy fraud to matters under
title 11 and health care fraud to a “health care benefit program” restricts the subject matter that
can be prosecuted under these statutes.
194. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)).  Section 78j(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange—
. . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).  Willful violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 are subject to criminal prosecution.  See id. § 78(ff)(a) (making violators of the
Securities Act subject to criminal prosecution).  Recently, in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S.
642 (1997), the Court permitted criminal liability under section 10(b) to be predicated upon a
misappropriation theory.  See id. at 653-59.  The extent to which this will expand the object of
the offense remains to be seen.
195. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998) (making it unlawful to engage in fraud “in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security”).
196. Generic fraud statutes such as mail fraud have also been used in the prosecution of
“scheme or artifice to defraud” language of mail fraud but provides
an object of the fraud that limits the conduct subject to
prosecution.197
1. Bank fraud
Although the bank fraud statute198 was modeled after the mail fraud
statute, the legislature did not adopt the language of the mail fraud
statute in its “entirety.”199  Where mail and wire fraud are “directed at
the instrumentalities of fraud,” bank fraud “penalize[s] the
victimization” of a specific object.200  The “bank fraud statute was
expressly ‘designed to provide an effective vehicle for the prosecution
of frauds in which the victims are financial institutions that are
federally created, controlled or insured.’”201  Unlike mail and wire
fraud, the bank fraud statute is focused against a specific type of
fraud.202  Bank fraud has been found inapplicable “where money is
merely withdrawn legally from a federally insured bank by a victim
and where the bank itself is in no way victimized.”203
The necessity for a “financial institution”204 to be the victim serves a
                                                 
securities fraud.  See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (finding defendants
guilty of violating both the Securities Exchange Act and the mail and wire fraud statutes
because the alleged scheme at issue, although concerning the stock market, was carried out
through the use of the mails).
197. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text (detailing the different aspects of the
marriage fraud statute and comparing its language to the mail fraud statute).
198. The bank fraud statute provides:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property
owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
199. See United States v. Monostra, 125 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining the
differences between the bank fraud and mail fraud statutes).
200. See id.  Additionally, with respect to mail and wire fraud, some courts have found that
“[n]othing in the mail and wire fraud statutes requires that the party deprived of money or
property be the same party who is actually deceived.”  United States v. Christopher, 142 F.3d 46,
54 (1st Cir. 1998).
201. Monostra, 125 F.3d at 187 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 377 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3515, 3517).  “The two subsections of the statute express this in different terms:
§ 1344(1) prohibits schemes ‘to defraud a financial institution,’ while § 1344(2) prohibits
schemes to obtain money or property ‘owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial
institution.’”  See id. at 187.
202. In United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Circuit cited the
House Judiciary Committee’s deliberations when crafting the bank fraud statute, referring
particularly to congressional concerns about courts’ expansive interpretations of wire and mail
fraud statutes.  See id. at 906.  The court used this legislative history to rule against a broad
judicial interpretation of the bank fraud statute.  See id.
203. See id. at 904.
204. Although the defendant does not need to know of the federally insured status, it is
limiting function that differentiates bank fraud from generic statutes
such as the mail and wire fraud statutes.205  Some courts have also
distinguished the bank fraud statute’s use of the term “executes”
preceding the phrase “scheme or artifice” from the language used in
the mail and wire fraud statutes, by finding “that the bank fraud
statute imposes punishment only once for each execution of the
scheme while mail and wire fraud statutes punish each act in
furtherance of a scheme.”206  Although the bank fraud statute allows
for prosecutions involving “check kiting,”207 the necessity for the
financial institution to be the victim of the fraud208 creates a boundary
which precludes prosecutors from using the statute against an
unlimited array of frauds.209
                                                 
necessary for the government to prove “the federally-insured status of the affected institution.”
See United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353 (11th Cir. 1996).
205. Although the term “financial institution” limits the scope of the statute, the term is
broadly defined to cover many types of institutions.  See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, 2 CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY:  A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS
AND AGENTS § 8A:19 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1997) (listing nine types of financial institutions
covered by section 1344, including small business investment companies and branches of
foreign banks).  From the perspective of a bank official, therefore, the statute might seem overly
broad.  When contrasted with statutes such as mail fraud, which seldom offer restrictions on the
subject matter that can be prosecuted under the statute, the limitation in the bank fraud statute
to financial institutions makes the statute specific to one subject matter.
206. See David J. Elbaz et al., Note, Financial Institution Fraud, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 665, 677
(1997) (distinguishing the bank fraud statute from the mail and wire fraud statutes and
contending that “multiplicitous indictments” may cause defendants to be punished twice for the
same offense); see also Brian P. Perry, Note, “Execution” of a Scheme to Defraud, An Indictment of the
Bank Fraud Statute:  United States v. Lemon, 941 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1991), 61 U. CIN. L. REV.
745, 748 (1992) (“[The Lemon court] has greatly limited prosecutors’ ability to ‘pile-on’ charges
in bank fraud cases.”).  But see United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 847 (4th Cir. 1994)
(delineating each separate check as an individual, fraudulent scheme against a bank); United
States v. Poliak, 823 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing each execution of a scheme to
defraud to be considered a separate act under the bank fraud statute).
207. See United States v. Pless, 79 F.3d 1217, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming the district
court’s ruling that the owner of a sign manufacturing business was guilty of a “classic check kite”
in violation of the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994), when he cross-deposited checks
in two banks to hide his overdrafts).  Check kiting, however, was found to be beyond the false
statement statute of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.  See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982)
(asserting that the legislative history does not support a holding that the false statement statute
was intended to cover bad checks, and therefore was not applicable in the present check-kiting
case).
208. See T. Christopher McLaughlin et al., Note, Financial Institution Fraud, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 789, 797 (1998) (stating that the final element of section 1344 specifies that only financial
institutions with federal insurance may be victims under the statute).  This limitation, however,
does not preclude prosecutions against bank officers who “defraud the institutions they serve.”
See United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1518 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that bank officers with the
power to bind the bank can defraud the bank, thus meeting the requirement that the statute is
only applicable if a financial institution is the victim).  Courts have also found that schemes to
defraud that “expose[] a bank to a risk of loss [are] sufficient to satisfy section 1344.”  See
United States v. 105,800 Shares of Common Stock of Firstrock Bancorp, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1101,
1129 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing the
lower court where the bank’s customers and not the bank were the victims of the fraud).
2. Marriage fraud
Specific fraud statutes do not always resemble the mail fraud
statute.  For example, a specific provision in an immigration statute
criminalizes marriage fraud.210  This provision does not require proof
of a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”  In addition to limiting the
object of the fraud to “marriage fraud,” the provision also limits the
context of the fraud to “evading any provision of the immigration
laws.”211
The Marriage Fraud Act, passed in 1986, was claimed to be
“Congress’ response to the growing problem of sham marriages.”212
The specific legislation allows for prosecution without reliance upon
generic statutes, such as the false statement statute213 and the mail
fraud statute214 or reliance on conspiracy to defraud.215
Criminalization of marriage fraud may be subject to criticism as an
“inappropriate . . . method of deterring United States citizens or
permanent residents from entering into marriages with aliens to
facilitate the alien’s authorized admission into the United States.”216
Specific marriage fraud legislation demonstrates that the legislature
has reflected on the issue of marriage fraud and chosen to
criminalize the activity.217  Absent this specific legislation, prosecutors
                                                 
210. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997).  Section 1325(c), “Improper entry by
alien,” provides:  “Any individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of
evading any provision of the immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or
fined not more than $250,000, or both.”  Id.
211. See id.
212. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat.
3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Karen L. Rae, Comment,
Alienating Sham Marriages for Tougher Immigration Penalties:  Congress Enacts The Marriage Fraud Act,
15 PEPP. L. REV. 181, 204 (1988).
213. See Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174, 175 (9th Cir. 1967) (upholding a conviction for
marriage fraud under the code section prohibiting false statements to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964)).  Prosecutors have charged defendants with
both a violation of the false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. 1997), and
marriage fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (1994 & Supp. 1997).  See United States v. Dedhia, 134 F.3d
802, 805 (6th Cir. 1998).
214. See United States v. Olatunji, 872 F.2d 1161, 1168 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding legally
sufficient an indictment alleging that the defendant married for the purpose of obtaining
student aid, and thereby made false representations to the government in violation of the mail
fraud statute).
215. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615-20 (1953).  In Lutwak, the dissent
questioned whether a crime had been committed, stating that “[m]arriages of convenience are
not uncommon and it cannot be that we would hold it a fraud for one who has contracted a
marriage not forbidden by law to represent himself as wedded, even if there were grounds for
annulment or divorce and proceedings to that end were contemplated.”  Id. at 621 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
216. Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law:  Employer Sanctions and
Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 673 (1997).
217. See Rae, supra note 212, at 183 (discussing the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Policy report that urged Congress to enact tough, prophylatic measures to combat
marriage fraud, and Congress’ response a year later with the Immigration Marriage Fraud
would be left to apply generic fraud statutes to conduct that some
might believe should not be the subject of criminal law.  Specific
legislation also provides explicit notice of what will be considered
criminal conduct.
III. LIMITING FRAUD STATUTES
Various approaches can be used to limit a fraud statute.  The three
methods outlined here demonstrate that the legislature can play a
crucial and necessary role in setting the boundaries of a fraud statute.
Limitations on the object of the offense,218 more precise definitions of
fraud,219 and the imposition of monetary thresholds220 can offer both
the public and prosecutors certainty in law.  Explicit legislation
designed to curtail fraudulent conduct will make novel theories of
prosecution unnecessary and minimize appellate reversals.
A. Limiting the Object of the Fraud
Generic statutes can best be limited by offering an object with
specificity.  As previously noted, mail and wire fraud permit
prosecution of an endless array of frauds.221  In contrast, bankruptcy
fraud, health care fraud, marriage fraud, and bank fraud provide
explicit subject matters and oftentimes specific victims, foreclosing
prosecution of conduct falling outside the specific guidelines
provided by the legislature.222  Although, the level of specificity of a
statute may be determined in part by the subject matter being
criminalized, existing statutes that have specificity provide models for
legislative drafting.
Although most fraud statutes provide specificity, prosecutors
commonly use generic statutes, such as mail and wire fraud.223
Precluding the use of generic statutes when conduct can be
prosecuted by a specific statute can provide limitations.  Limiting
fraud statutes, however, cannot be left to the judiciary.  Courts
seldom curtail prosecutorial decision-making by restricting the use of
                                                 
Amendments of 1986).
218. See infra Part III.A (discussing some of the ways to limit the object of the fraud).
219. See infra Part III.B (combining the strategies of limiting the object of the fraud and
limiting the definition of fraud to narrow the scope of a fraud statute).
220. See infra Part III.C.
221. See supra Parts II.A.2-3 (describing cases dealing with the application of general mail
and wire fraud statutes to other forms of fraudulent acts).
222. See supra notes 191-217 and accompanying text (discussing other fraud statutes that are
more limited in scope and application).
223. See Podgor, supra note 25, at 264 (explaining that mail fraud is the “most commonly
used predicate act to a RICO charge”).
a generic statute when a more specific statute also applies.224  The
judiciary has also been relatively lax in recognizing the rule of lenity,
the vagueness doctrine, and federalism concerns.225
Explicitly defining the object encompassed by a statute also
provides limits.  For example, Congress, in passing a fraud statute to
criminalize conduct connected with access devices,226 provided a
definition of the term “access device.”227  Despite the definition
provided by the legislature, courts still needed to resolve whether the
device that was the subject of the prosecution was within the terms of
the statute.228  On occasion courts dismissed an indictment or
reversed a conviction where prosecutors used the statute beyond the
legislative language.229  In some cases, courts saw it within their
                                                 
224. See United States v. Armijo, 834 F.2d 132, 136 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that as a matter
of prosecutorial discretion the government may prosecute any act under more than one
statute).  But see United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (“There
is . . . no need to use the mail fraud statute as a ‘stopgap device’ until ‘particularized legislation’
is enacted ‘to deal directly with the evil,’ for Congress has enacted legislation that affords
adequate protection of the public interest [in this case] in the collection of income taxes.”);
Ellen S. Podgor, Tax Fraud-Mail Fraud:  Synonymous, Cumulative or Diverse?, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
903, 933 (1988) (arguing against the use of mail fraud for tax violations); see also U.S. Attorney’s
Manual, supra note 78, § 6-4.210 (containing prosecutorial guidelines restricting the use of mail
fraud for tax violations).
225. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 99 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 346
(1994) (describing the Court’s failure to honor the rule of lenity in a case); Gregory A. Loken &
Lisa R. Bambino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 177-78 (1993) (discussing the failure to use the rule of lenity in a
case).
226. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796, 2087 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1994 & Supp. 1997)) (criminalizing
fraud and related activities in connection with access devices).
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
[T]he term “access device” means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic
serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification number, or
other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier, or other
means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access
device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be
used to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper
instrument) . . . .
Id.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 1071, 1072 (11th Cir. 1998) (determining that
a merchant account number is an “access device”); United States v. Nguyen, 81 F.3d 912, 914
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a blank credit card is an “access device”).  In United States v. Lee,
815 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1987), the defendant argued on appeal that 18 U.S.C. § 1029 was
“unconstitutionally vague because its ‘prohibitions are not clearly defined.’”  Id. at 973.  The
Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that “[a]lthough the language of the statute
anticipates new forms of ‘access devices,’ it offers both adequate warning to defendants like Lee
that their conduct is unlawful and adequate guidance to judges and juries.”  Id. at 974.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 81 F.3d 131, 134 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that a
“tumbling cellular telephone” was not within the scope of the statute prior to the 1994
amendment); United States v. Brady, 13 F.3d 334, 338-39 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that
“altered cellular telephones used for purposes of free riding on the cellular telephone system—
are not ‘access devices’ within the meaning of § 1029”).  But see United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d
770, 772 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding a tumbling cellular telephone to be within the scope of
section 1029).
province to extend a statute to cover a new type of access device.230
The legislature, however, later amended the statute to criminalize
some of the alleged criminal activity previously omitted by the
statute.231  Specific legislative action allows courts to focus on the
object of the offense as opposed to making a judgment on the
“wrongfulness” of the fraud.232
B. Limiting the Definition of Fraud
Fraud statutes can also be limited by the definition offered to the
term fraud.  The term “scheme or artifice to defraud” can be found
throughout the United States Code.233  It is a term which can serve to
expand the conduct subject to prosecution under a statute.234  This is
particularly true as a result of the legislative definition which provides
that “the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services.”235  A limitation is offered, however, where the object of the
offense is narrowly provided.236  Likewise, when a fraud statute
                                                 
230. See United States v. Brewer, 835 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
language of the statute provided notice that misuse of long distance access codes is a criminal
act under the statute).  In Brewer, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Although its legislative history suggests that the primary focus of section 1029 was to
fill cracks in the criminal law targeted at credit card abuse, we are persuaded that
Brewer’s conduct is reached by a practical reading of the statute.  Both the Senate and
House Reports on the statute state that the definition of “access device” was intended
to be “broad enough to encompass technological advances.”
Id. at 553.
231. Congress amended the statute in 1994 to address tumbling cellular phones. See
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 206(a)(2), 108
Stat. 4289, 4291 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(8) (1994 & Supp. 1997));
see also Morris, 81 F.3d at 133 (stating that “Congress amended the statute to address specifically
tumbling cellular phones” under section 1029).
232. See, e.g., Brewer, 835 F.2d at 553 (stating that the language of section 1029 provides
notice that misuse of a long distance access code is a crime).  The Fifth Circuit noted:  “‘[T]he
requirement that statutes give fair notice cannot be used as a shield by one who is already bent
on serious wrongdoing.’  At the very least, Brewer must have known that hacking out long
distance access codes to obtain free long distance service was ‘wrong.’”  Id. (footnotes omitted).
233. Fraud statutes that use the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” are not limited to title
18 of the United States Code.  See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6(o) (1994) (prohibiting “[f]raud and
misrepresentation by commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, and associated
persons”); 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994) (“Fraudulent interstate transactions”); 42 U.S.C. § 3220
(1994) (assessing “[p]enalties” for “false statements, embezzlement, misapplication of funds,
false book entries, schemes to defraud, and speculation”).
234. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (using the term the “scheme or artifice to defraud” in
the mail fraud context).
235. See, e.g., id.  § 1346 (defining language to include a person’s right to “honest services”).
236. See, e.g., id. § 1344 (limiting the “scheme or artifice . . . to defraud” by the object in the
bank fraud statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (limiting the “scheme or
artifice . . . to defraud” by the object in the health fraud statute).
In contrast, where several objects are offered as media for prosecution, the “scheme or
artifice to defraud” language can have a broader reach.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994)
(proscribing “[t]ransportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent State tax stamps,
specifically limits the fraud application by not using the term “scheme
or artifice to defraud,” a generic medium can be curtailed.
The computer fraud statute237 is an example of a fraud statute
where the legislature did not use the term “scheme or artifice to
defraud.”  Computers, like wires and the mails, could easily provide a
generic object that would permit an array of conduct to be
prosecuted under the statute.  The legislature, however, in drafting
the computer fraud statute offered restrictive language which
resulted in clear boundaries as to the conduct covered by the
statute.238  In drafting the computer fraud statute, the legislature used
seven specific applications of fraud.239  The statute criminalizes activity
                                                 
or articles used in counterfeiting”).
237. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
238. See id.  The statute does, however, provide for attempts in addition to the actual
completed conduct.  See id. § 1030(b) (authorizing penalties of fines and imprisonment for
attempted fraudulent activities under the statute).
239. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a).  This section provides:
(a) Whoever—
(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding
authorized access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information
that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an
Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure
for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as
defined in paragraph y of section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with
reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the injury of
the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation willfully
communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or
transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to
receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or
employee of the United States entitled to receive it;
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains—
(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or
of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file
of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.);
(B) information from any department or agency of the United States; or
(C)information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an
interstate or foreign communication;
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a
department or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer of that
department or agency that is exclusively for the use of the Government of the
United States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, is used by
or for the Government of the United States and such conduct affects that use by
or for the Government of the United States;
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct
furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the
fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the
value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period;
(5)(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without
such as browsing in a government computer and the interstate
trafficking of passwords.240  The statute does not authorize the
prosecution of any fraudulent activity that merely uses the
computer.241  By explicitly outlining the types of fraudulent conduct
that can be prosecuted as computer fraud, prosecutors are prevented
from broadening the scope of the statute to encompass any type of
fraudulent conduct that merely happens to involve the use of a
computer.242
C. Limiting the Monetary Threshold
Fraud statutes can also be limited by the monetary threshold
specified in the statute.  The extent to which a statute will be limited
by its object may in some instances be a subject of judicial
controversy.  For example, the major fraud statute,243 a relatively new
statute,244 offers generic language which would appear to permit
                                                 
authorization, to a protected computer;
(B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and
as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or
(C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and
as a result of such conduct, causes damage;
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section 1029) in
any password or similar information through which a computer may be accessed
without authorization, if—
(A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or
(B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United States;
(7) with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, educational
institution, financial institution, government entity, or other legal entity, any
money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to cause damage to a protected computer;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
Id.
240. See id. § 1030(a)(3); id. § 1030(a)(5)(B); ELLEN S. PODGOR & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME IN A NUTSHELL 237-40 (2d ed. 1997) (examining the seven types of computer
activities prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)).
241. The statute has the potential to become a generic statute by the use of the word
“protected computer,” which is defined to include “a computer which is used in interstate or
foreign commerce or communication.”  See id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).  The term as used in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(4) requires that one “accesses a protected computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access.”  Id.
242. See id. § 1030(a).  Prosecutors have used other statutes, such as wire fraud, for the
prosecution of computer crimes.  See Glenn D. Baker, Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted:  Computer
Crime in the 1990s, 12 COMPUTER/L.J. 61, 79-91 (1993) (discussing other federal statutes used to
prosecute computer-related crimes); Eli Lederman, Criminal Liability for Breach of Confidential
Commercial Information, 38 EMORY L.J. 921, 967-77 (1989) (stating that many states have enacted
statutes protecting confidential commercial information which have been used for the
prosecution of computer crimes).
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (1994) (outlining what constitutes major fraud in the United
States).
244. See Major Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-700, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 4631, 4631 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (1994)).  Enacted in 1988, the Major Fraud Act is “[p]atterned generally
after the federal bank fraud statute.”  See Major Scott W. MacKay, Major Fraud Against the United
prosecution of a wide range of criminal conduct.245  The statute
focuses on major procurement fraud against the United States.246  In
reality, the high monetary threshold required to invoke the statute
makes it less likely to be subject to the criticism suggested by this
Article.247
The extent to which the major fraud statute will become more
pervasive may rest on how courts compute the dollar threshold
needed for application of the major fraud statute.248  A generic
application could result if a court interprets the $1,000,000
jurisdictional amount required by the statute to be met “so long as
the prime contract, a subcontract, a supply agreement, or any
constituent part of such contract is valued at one million or more.”249
In contrast, the object of the fraud is more limited when a court finds
that “the value of the contract is determined by looking to the
specific contract upon which the fraud is based.”250
A statute with a low monetary threshold may offer a more
                                                 
States, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1992, at 9.
245. See MacKay, supra note 244, at 8-9 (“Section 1031 is as broad and flexible as the federal
mail and wire fraud statutes, but it does not require the Government to prove that an accused
used the mail or a telecommunication system to effect a fraud.”).
246. See Brooks v. United States, 111 F.3d 365, 368 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that 18
U.S.C. § 1031(a) is applicable to any contractor involved with the United States as long as any
part of the agreement has a value of at least $1,000,000 or more).
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (defining the jurisdictional amount for prosecution as
$1,000,000).
248. See Brooks, 111 F.3d at 369 (recognizing that its conclusion that the statute is applicable
as long as any part of the contract is valued at $1,000,000 is in direct contrast with dictum by the
Second Circuit regarding a similar case); United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that the jurisdictional amount of the major fraud statute is satisfied only if the specific
contract is valued at $1,000,000).
Courts have also differed on whether the major fraud statute punishes each execution of a
scheme to defraud or individual acts in furtherance of a scheme to defraud.  Compare United
States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that, like the bank fraud statute, the
major fraud statute punishes each “knowing ‘execution’ of the fraudulent scheme and not simply
devising the fraudulent scheme itself”), and United States v. Wiehl, 904 F. Supp. 81, 88
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that the statute “punishes each execution of a scheme to defraud”),
with United States v. Frequency Elecs., 862 F. Supp. 834, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that
the word “execute” includes the acts in furtherance of the scheme to defraud).
249. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 368-69.  Determining what is included within a monetary
jurisdictional amount is not limited to fraud statutes with high monetary thresholds.  This issue
has also arisen where the jurisdictional amount is relatively low.  In United States v. Draves, 103
F.3d 1328 (7th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (1994), a
statute which “punishes the knowing use of a fraudulently obtained credit card to acquire
‘money, goods, services, or anything else of value which within any one-year period has a value
aggregating $1,000 or more,’” should include sales tax in meeting the dollar threshold required
for criminal culpability.  See id. at 1332.  The court found that “aggregate value,” as used in
section 1644(a), indeed did include sales tax.  See id.
250. Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551.  Nadi held that the “value of the specific contract or subcontract
to which the fraud is connected is controlling and not the value of related contracts or
subcontracts.”  Id. at 552.  The court in Nadi noted that an “opposite view would subject
subcontractors to liability under the Major Fraud Act no matter how insignificant the value of
their subcontracts.”  See id.
expansive reading.  For example, the program fraud statute,251
enacted in 1984, applies “when governmental or other entities
receive more than ten thousand dollars in federal benefits within one
year.”252  The statute has been applied to a wide array of fraudulent
conduct.253  The judiciary has been left to place limits on a generic
application where prosecutors have exceeded the limits of the
statute.254  Despite the judicial limits placed on 18 U.S.C. § 666, this
relatively new statute adds a new dimension to the federalizing of
“program fraud” occurring on the state level.255
The three limitations outlined here serve to place boundaries on
                                                 
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).  Although section 666 can be considered essentially a
bribery or theft statute and outside the purview of this Article, it has also been referred to as the
“program fraud statute.”  See United States v. LaHue, 998 F. Supp. 1182, 1184-85 (D. Kan. 1998).
The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section exists—
(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal
government, or any agency thereof—
(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority
knowingly converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner or
intentionally misapplies, property that—
(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such
organization, government, or agency; or
(B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or
agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be
influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or
series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving
anything of value of $5,000 or more; or
(2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person, with
intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State, local or
Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 666.
252. See George D. Brown, Stealth Statute—Corruption, the Spending Power, and the Rise of 18
U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 248 (1998) (discussing the scope and case
development of section 666).
253. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 666
applies in all cases in which the agency or organization involved receives federal funding).
254. See LaHue, 998 F. Supp. at 1188 (“Section 666’s legislative history reveals that although
Congress intended the term Federal program to be construed broadly, Congress did not aim
section 666 at organizations that merely receive federal ‘benefits’ after such benefits have
reached their intended beneficiary.”); see also United States v. Copeland, 143 F.3d 1439, 1441
(11th Cir. 1998) (“The scope of § 666, however, is not limitless; the statute clearly indicates that
only those contractual relationships constituting some form of ‘Federal assistance’ fall within
the scope of the statute.”).
255. See Brown, supra note 252, at 313 (“The courts are dealing with a broadly drafted law
that Congress enacted to deal with a relatively narrow set of problems.  The text can enable this
law to become a form of general federal anti-corruption statute in any jurisdiction that receives
more than $10,000 in federal assistance.”); see also Daniel N. Rosenstein, Note, Section 666:  The
Beast in the Federal Criminal Arsenal, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 673, 674 (1990) (“[I]n eliminating the
problems caused by the narrow boundaries of earlier statutes, Congress enacted a general
federal criminal statute of potentially limitless scope and effect.”).
fraud statutes.  By providing a specific object of the offense, specific
definitions within a statute, limitations of what will be considered
fraud, and a reflective monetary threshold, fraud becomes a known
quality within a statute.  Absent these restrictions, the contours of
what will be considered fraud are left to gut reactions of individuals
who may be motivated by their own personal disgust with the alleged
conduct.256
CONCLUSION
The amorphous nature of the “concept” of fraud, coupled with its
haphazard disbursement throughout the laws, makes it prime for a
consistent methodology.  There has been substantial discussion of
federal criminal law reform.257  This is particularly meaningful in light
of fraud being both a civil and criminal concept.  The charging
discretion afforded prosecutors becomes especially pronounced
when examining the “blurring”258 between what will be considered
civil fraud and what will be prosecuted as criminal fraud.
Although consistency is promoted, a single fraud statute may be
more cumbersome than beneficial.  The vast circumstances to which
fraud applies necessitate an array of different provisions.  Some
consistency in the statutory construction could enhance the
interpretative process.  Consolidation, deletion of redundant statutes,
and the writing of specific provisions would heighten the prosecution
of criminal fraud.  Most important, however, is the need for
limitations on generic fraud statutes.  A “dynamic”259 approach to
interpreting fraud statutes is unwarranted where criminality is not
obvious and prosecutorial discretion has exceeded the text,
                                                 
256. See United States v. Goodman, 984 F.2d 235, 240 (8th Cir. 1993).  In Goodman, the
Eighth Circuit asserted that, “[w]ithout some objective evidence demonstrating a scheme to
defraud, all promotional schemes to make money, even if ‘sleazy’ or ‘shrewd’ would be subject
to prosecution on the mere whim of the prosecutor.  More is required under our criminal law.”
Id.
257. See, e.g., Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform:  Is It Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 195, 201 (1997) (discussing whether a new federal criminal code is possible); Paul H.
Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code:  A Top Ten List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 268
(1997) (providing ten suggestions on how to reform the federal criminal code).  Professor
Kathleen Brickey noted that “[t]he proposed criminal code [recommended by the Brown
Commission] would, for the first time, codify all federal felonies in a single title of the United
States Code.”  Brickey, supra note 43, at 162.
258. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost:  The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876-77 (1992) (discussing the
distinctions between civil and criminal laws); see also Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The
Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1871 (1992) (discussing a
“middle ground” in punitive civil jurisprudence).
259. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1483 (1987) (stating that statutes should be interpreted in light of current societal, political,
and legal contexts).
“legislative expectation,” and the natural “evolution of the statute.”260
Although some may believe that certain generic fraud statutes need
to be left as “stopgap device[s]” until the legislature has the
opportunity to pass “particularized legislation,”261 such a view transfers
the decision-making authority to the executive.262  The judiciary in
reviewing the executive decisions involving generic statutes has found
some of the “novel theories” of prosecutors to be beyond the scope of
the legislation.263  The fact that fraud lacks a clear definition makes
this process uniquely troublesome.  Technological advances should
not be used as an excuse to authorize executive and judicial
legislating.  Likewise, executive efficiency does not warrant discarding
a view of “legislative supremacy.”264
                                                 
260. See id. at 1483.
261. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(describing the mail fraud statute as an effective method of prosecuting new frauds that
Congress has not yet addressed).
262. But cf. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 469 (1996) (arguing “that the law would be better if the delegated lawmaking authority
that courts now exercise were instead wielded by the Department of Justice”).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the
prosecutorial theory because “fraud statutes do not cover all behavior which strays from the
ideal”); United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1262 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting the use of “false
pretenses theory” for an allegedly excessive attorney fee); see also, e.g., Starkman, supra note 27,
at B7 (suggesting that recent reversals of mail and wire and fraud cases demonstrate that the
government has gone beyond legislative intent).
264. But see Kahan, supra note 24, at 5 (finding a “legislative supremacy view” as “fiction”).
